United States v. Marquis Wilson
960 F.3d 136
| 3rd Cir. | 2020Background
- In November 2013 three men robbed two Wells Fargo branches in Pennsylvania on consecutive days; about $151,000 total was taken and a bank employee (Kane) later cooperated.
- Wilson was linked by cell‑site data and a tipster to the first robbery; police later stopped a rental car in North Carolina, found large amounts of cash after a consent search, and released the men.
- Kane and coconspirator Foster pleaded and cooperated; Wilson conceded he was a robber at trial (arguing the gun was fake), Moore maintained innocence.
- Defense counsel stipulated at trial that both branches were federally insured, satisfying the jurisdictional element of 18 U.S.C. § 2113; defendants later challenged that stipulation as a Sixth Amendment violation.
- A jury convicted Wilson and Moore of armed bank robbery, conspiracy, and two § 924(c) counts; Wilson was sentenced to 519 months and Moore to 385 months.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Counsel’s stipulation that banks were federally insured (Sixth Amendment) | Wilson: stipulation was "tantamount to a guilty plea" and counsel could not concede a jurisdictional element without client consent | Government: whether to concede a jurisdictional element is tactical and belongs to counsel | Counsel may stipulate to jurisdictional elements without defendant’s consent; this is not per se structural Sixth Amendment error; such decisions are tactical, not fundamental |
| Validity of traffic stop (Fourth Amendment) | Moore: stop was pretextual/unsupported and unlawfully prolonged | Government: officer observed traffic violations and developed reasonable suspicion to extend stop based on inconsistencies and other indicia of drug trafficking | Stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and any extension was justified; suppression properly denied |
| Admissibility of cell‑site location data (Carpenter issue) | Wilson/Moore: data obtained under §2703(d) should be suppressed after Carpenter | Government: order issued before Carpenter; good‑faith exception applies | Third Circuit good‑faith precedent controls: evidence obtained under §2703(d) before Carpenter admissible under good‑faith exception |
| Failure to sever after Wilson’s concession | Moore: concession undermined his defense and required severance | Government: jury instructed to consider each defendant separately; no clear substantial prejudice shown | No plain error; district court did not abuse discretion and curative jury instruction sufficed |
| Mistrial after witness mentioned drug dealing | Moore: witness’s unsolicited remark about drug dealing required mistrial | Government: remark was inadvertent and unrelated to charged offenses; curative instruction given | Denial of mistrial not an abuse; curative instruction adequate and remark not likely devastating |
| Prosecutorial vouching in closing | Moore: prosecutor vouched for witnesses and injected non‑record knowledge | Government: statements were argument about plea agreements and weaknesses in defense theory | Statements permissible in context; no reversible error (some rhetoric unfortunate but not improper) |
| Sufficiency of evidence (federal insurance, Moore’s involvement, reality of gun) | Defendants: insufficient proof of federal insurance; Moore lacked evidence linking him; gun might have been a BB or prop | Government: certificate and counsel’s stipulation established insurance; cooperators and witnesses placed Moore at robberies and described a real Glock .40 | Evidence sufficient on all points; stipulation + certificate satisfied jurisdictional element; jury rationally found Moore involved and gun real |
| §924(c) predicate and jury instruction | Defendants: conspiracy may not be a "crime of violence"; instruction erroneous | Government: armed bank robbery is categorically a crime of violence; instruction allowed alternative predicates | Armed bank robbery is a §924(c) crime of violence; any error about conspiracy predicate harmless because convictions on bank‑robbery predicate sustained |
| First Step Act retroactivity & sentence reasonableness | Defendants: qualify for First Step Act relief because appeal pending when Act passed; Wilson: sentence substantively excessive | Government: Hodge controls; Act not retroactive to sentences imposed pre‑Act | First Step Act relief denied (binding circuit precedent). Wilson’s within‑Guidelines sentence was reasonable and not an abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- McCoy v. Louisiana, 138 S. Ct. 1500 (2018) (defendant controls defense objectives; counsel cannot concede factual guilt over client’s express insistence on innocence)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (ineffective assistance two‑prong test for counsel performance and prejudice)
- Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (circumstances where counsel’s failure amounts to structural error)
- Gonzalez‑Lopez v. United States, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (right to counsel of choice is structural)
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (right to self‑representation and defendant’s control over defense)
- Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (pretextual stops permissible when officer observes traffic violation)
- Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015) (limits on duration of traffic stops; extensions require independent reasonable suspicion)
- Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (cell‑site location info generally requires a warrant supported by probable cause)
- United States v. Goldstein, 914 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2019) (good‑faith exception applies to §2703(d) orders issued before Carpenter)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- United States v. Johnson, 899 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2018) (armed bank robbery is a crime of violence under §924(c))