United States v. Marquez-Lobos
697 F.3d 759
9th Cir.2012Background
- Marquez-Lobos appeals a 58‑month sentence for illegal reentry after deportation, based on a 16‑level enhancement for a prior kidnapping conviction under ARS § 13‑1304.
- The PSR treated the 1985 kidnapping conviction as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A), resulting in a total offense level of 21.
- The district court overruled objections to the enhancement and sentenced the defendant to 58 months.
- The panel applies Taylor/modified Taylor analysis to determine if ARS § 13‑1304 qualifies as kidnapping in its generic sense and thus a “crime of violence.”
- The court ultimately holds ARS § 13‑1304 categorically meets the generic definition of kidnapping and affirms the sentence.
- An order at the top amended the opinion and denied rehearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does ARS § 13‑1304 categorically qualify as a ‘crime of violence’? | Marquez-Lobos argues the statute lacks the force element and any generic kidnapping element. | Marquez-Lobos contends ARS § 13‑1304 contains the nefarious purpose and unlawful deprivation of liberty elements of kidnapping. | Yes; ARS § 13‑1304 categorically meets the generic definition of kidnapping. |
| Does ARS § 13‑1304 contain the necessary force element to qualify as a crime of violence? | There are situations where restraint occurs without force. | Statute’s restraint can occur with limited or no force, undermining a force element. | The statute can meet kidnapping without a force element, but still satisfies the generic definition. |
| Is ARS § 13‑1304’s ‘nefarious purpose’ requirement consistent with the generic definition of kidnapping? | The nefarious purposes in ARS § 13‑1304 may be broader than the generic definition. | The generic definition requires a nefarious purpose beyond mere restraint; ARS § 13‑1304 satisfies this. | ARS § 13‑1304 contains a nefarious purpose element consistent with the generic definition. |
| Should the court apply the categorical analysis or modified categorical analysis here? | If the statute fits the generic kidnapping, the categorical approach suffices. | If not categorically fitting, the record could support a modified categorical approach. | Categorical analysis applies; the statute matches the generic kidnapping definition, so no further record-based inquiry required. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Gonzalez-Perez, 472 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 2007) (held generic kidnapping includes nefarious purpose and unlawful deprivation of liberty)
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (S. Ct. 1990) (establishes categorical and modified categorical approaches for burglary/violent offenses)
- Pimentel-Flores v. United States, 339 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2003) (describes when to apply categorical vs. modified categorical analysis)
- Corona-Sanchez v. United States, 291 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc standards for when to use judicially noticeable facts in modified categorical analysis)
- United States v. Iniguez-Barba, 485 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2007) (discusses age/consent aspects in generic kidnapping analysis)
- United States v. Cervantes-Blanco, 504 F.3d 576 (5th Cir. 2007) (further treatment of generic kidnapping elements in Fifth Circuit)
- State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549 (Ariz. 1993) (Arizona kidnapping scope; force not always required)