United States v. Marlon Eason
953 F.3d 1184
| 11th Cir. | 2020Background
- Consolidated direct appeals of Marlon Eason, Carlton Styles, and Jeffrey Lawson, each sentenced as a career offender in part based on a prior Hobbs Act robbery conviction (18 U.S.C. § 1951).
- The Sentencing Guidelines career-offender provision (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1) applies if the offense of conviction is a felony that is a "crime of violence" per U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).
- § 4B1.2(a) defines "crime of violence" by an elements clause (force "against the person of another") and an enumerated-offenses clause (including robbery and extortion).
- Hobbs Act robbery criminalizes taking property from a person by actual or threatened force or fear of injury to the person or property (expressly references property as well as person).
- The Eleventh Circuit applied the categorical approach and held Hobbs Act robbery is neither a crime of violence under the elements clause nor a categorical match to the Guidelines’ enumerated robbery or extortion definitions; each defendant’s sentence was vacated and remanded.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Hobbs Act robbery satisfies § 4B1.2(a)’s elements clause | Hobbs Act robbery covers threats to property as well as persons, so it is broader than the elements clause | Hobbs Act’s proximity-language (taking "from the person or in the presence of another") and common-law roots show it targets violence against persons | No — statute reaches threats to property not "against the person," so it fails the elements clause |
| Whether Hobbs Act robbery is an enumerated "robbery" or "extortion" under § 4B1.2(a) | Hobbs Act robbery is broader than generic robbery/extortion because it allows threats to property and non-proximate property threats | Hobbs Act robbery is coextensive or substantially equivalent to the generic robbery/extortion definitions | No — not a categorical match to generic robbery; extortion in the Guidelines requires fear/threat of "physical injury" (to a person), so property threats fall outside it |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (establishes categorical approach for predicate-offense analysis)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (statute broader than generic definition cannot serve as predicate)
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (presume conviction rests on least culpable conduct for categorical analysis)
- Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (Sup. Ct. decision on degree-of-force in robbery; limited to statutes requiring force against a person)
- United States v. Camp, 903 F.3d 594 (6th Cir.) (Hobbs Act robbery not crime of violence under Guidelines)
- United States v. O’Connor, 874 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir.) (Hobbs Act robbery not an enumerated crime of violence)
- United States v. St. Hubert, 909 F.3d 335 (11th Cir.) (distinguishes § 924(c) analysis because § 924(c) covers force against property)
- United States v. House, 825 F.3d 381 (8th Cir.) (interpreting related "serious violent felony" statute; relied in part on residual-clause analysis)