United States v. Marletta Jasmine Knowles, 889 F.3d 1251

Traffic stop of a Cadillac on Feb. 25, 2015: driver Camelin Desrosiers and passenger Marletta Knowles; officers observed Knowles for ~20 minutes and found $2,000 in money orders and $1,000 cash in the car. Money orders matched surveillance footage and were purchased with prepaid cards obtained using stolen identities.
Knowles indicted for use of unauthorized access devices (18 U.S.C. §1029(a)(2)) and aggravated identity theft (§1028A(a)(1)); she pleaded not guilty and went to trial.
Government intended to elicit lay identification from Agent Tippens and Officer Caitlin that the Publix surveillance videos showed Knowles; defense moved in limine to exclude those identifications and disclosed Robert Wyman as a proposed expert who would say the videos did not show Knowles.
District court allowed the government officers to give lay identification under Fed. R. Evid. 701 but excluded Wyman — first as an expert (Rule 702) and then as a lay witness (Rule 701), concluding he was not competent to offer the lay opinion.
At trial Agent Tippens identified Knowles as the person in the videos; defense presented two former coworkers who testified the videos did not show Knowles. Jury convicted Knowles; she was sentenced to 30 months.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of government officer’s lay identification (Rule 701 / Rule 403)	Knowles argued Tippens’ ID was unduly prejudicial under Rule 403 because he was a law-enforcement agent involved in the stop and the court excluded comparable defense testimony.	Government argued Tippens’ familiarity justified lay ID under Rule 701 and his testimony was not unfairly prejudicial.	Court assumed Rule 701 satisfied and held admission was not an abuse of discretion under Rule 403; no undue prejudice and defense could rebut with lay witnesses.
Exclusion of defense proposed lay witness (Wyman) (Rule 701 / Rule 403)	Knowles argued Wyman had equal or greater familiarity and should be allowed to give lay ID; exclusion was unfair given court admitted Tippens’ opinion.	Government argued Wyman gained familiarity as a retained expert (not proper lay), was properly excluded as an expert, and his testimony would mislead if cross-examined about the expert rejection.	Court held exclusion of Wyman’s lay ID was an abuse of discretion (equal-treatment principle) but the error was harmless because two coworkers gave similar identification testimony.

United States v. Pierce, 136 F.3d 770 (11th Cir. 1998) (lay ID admissible only if witness’ familiarity makes them more likely than jury to identify defendant)
United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2011) (standard of review for lay opinion admissibility)
United States v. Hands, 184 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1999) (harmless-error standard for evidentiary errors)
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997) (risk that evidence reveals prior convictions or collateral matters can be unfairly prejudicial)
United States v. Beck, 418 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2005) (probation officer’s repeated contact provided sufficient familiarity for lay ID)
United States v. Contreras, 536 F.3d 1167 (10th Cir. 2008) (brief repeated contacts can support lay ID)
United States v. Jadlowe, 628 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2010) (officer who merely created or viewed surveillance may be no better than jury at ID)