United States v. Mark Mason Alexander, 782 F.3d 1251

Mark Alexander, CEO of Hydrajet Technology (Georgia) and Hydrajet Mena (Dubai), arranged sales and installations of waterjet cutting machines that ultimately were shipped to companies in Iran. He admitted involvement and price decisions to federal agents after searches of his business.
A grand jury indicted Alexander for conspiracy to export goods to Iran without a license in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and 18 U.S.C. § 371; jury convicted him and the district court sentenced him to 18 months.
Before trial Alexander sought six foreign depositions under Fed. R. Crim. P. 15, including a deposition of codefendant Karim Babakhani in Iran; the district court permitted five but denied Babakhani’s deposition as cumulative/immaterial and for countervailing concerns (hearsay, self-incrimination, fugitive status).
Midtrial a juror reported that unknown people momentarily blocked her car in the courthouse parking lot; Alexander moved for a mistrial. The district court refused further inquiry, admonished jurors, implemented security measures, and asked jurors if they could remain impartial; none responded negatively.
During trial the judge addressed the jury twice to clarify law: (1) corrected an officer’s testimony suggesting mere negotiations were legal by explaining the law of conspiracy; (2) limited the use of testimony about a business “feud” to credibility issues.

Issue	Alexander's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Denial of foreign deposition of Babakhani	Needed to show exculpatory testimony (dealings via Ahmad; limited contact with Alexander; shipment halted)	Testimony was immaterial/cumulative; hearsay and self-incrimination concerns; fugitive status problematic	District court did not abuse discretion in denying deposition (no reversible error)
Denial of mistrial after parking-lot incident	Incident risked juror intimidation/extrinsic influence; court should have investigated and declared mistrial	No colorable showing the incident related to matter before jury; speculative; court’s admonition and security sufficed	No abuse of discretion; defendant failed to show extrinsic influence requiring inquiry
Judge addressing jury on conspiracy law midtrial	Judge’s comments risked commenting on evidence and prejudicing jury	Clarifications were legal instructions, not commentary on facts; permissible to correct misunderstandings	No abuse of discretion; judge properly clarified law and limited purpose of feud testimony

Drogoul v. United States, 1 F.3d 1546 (11th Cir. 1993) (standards for allowing pretrial depositions under Rule 15)
Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (U.S. 1954) (extraneous juror contact presumed prejudicial if about matter pending before the jury)
United States v. Barshov, 733 F.2d 842 (11th Cir. 1984) (duty to investigate arises only after colorable showing of extrinsic influence)
United States v. McNair, 605 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2010) (government need not prove direct contact between co-conspirators)
United States v. Cuthel, 903 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir. 1990) (court need not grant immunity or authorize depositions when defendants could testify to same exculpatory facts)
United States v. Betner, 489 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1974) (insufficient inquiry into juror contacts with prosecutor’s office reversed)
Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466 (U.S. 1965) (prejudice where jurors continually associated with key witnesses)
United States v. Jenkins, 901 F.2d 1075 (11th Cir. 1990) (trial judge should limit commentary to jury)