United States v. Mark Marcoccia
686 F. App'x 138
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Marcoccia pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute a controlled-substance analogue ("bath salts"); he managed finances and concealed proceeds while a co‑conspirator handled distribution.
- The Presentence Report designated Marcoccia a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 based on two prior felony drug convictions (a 2004 state meth possession conviction and a 2007 federal meth conspiracy conviction).
- Without the career-offender enhancement his guideline range would have been 27–33 months; with it the range rose to 151–188 months. The government had stipulated to a base offense level of 14 (minus 2 for acceptance), but the PSR’s calculation governed sentencing.
- At sentencing the District Court found the career‑offender designation correct under the plain text of the Guidelines, acknowledged the Guidelines range was excessive, and chose to reduce the sentence by granting a substantial downward variance (not a departure).
- The court imposed 96 months’ imprisonment (a 55‑month downward variance from the properly calculated Guidelines range) and Marcoccia appealed, arguing: (1) misapplication of the career‑offender rule, (2) failure to consider downward departures, and (3) substantive unreasonableness of the sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Marcoccia’s two prior felonies must be counted separately for career‑offender status under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) | Marcoccia: the two convictions should be treated as a single conviction (not two strikes) because they arise from related conduct and he is not the prototypical recidivist targeted by § 4B1.1 | Government/District Court: convictions were charged in different instruments and sentenced on different days, so § 4A1.2(a)(2) treats them as separate | The court affirmed: under the plain language of § 4A1.2(a)(2) the prior state and federal sentences count separately and career‑offender status was properly applied |
| Whether the District Court procedurally erred by failing to rule on motions for downward departure | Marcoccia: court stated there were no departure motions and therefore failed step two of Booker’s three‑step sentencing procedure | District Court/Government: court’s remarks and actions demonstrate it exercised discretion to deny departures and instead granted a variance; Marcoccia’s counsel accepted the variance approach | Affirmed: no reviewable procedural error or, at most, harmless/plain‑error; the record shows the court intended a variance and any misstatement did not affect the outcome |
| Whether the imposed 96‑month sentence was substantively unreasonable | Marcoccia: career‑offender designation produced a draconian sentence and disparity; a lower sentence was required | District Court: considered § 3553(a) factors, defendant’s history, seriousness of role, need to avoid unwarranted disparity; granted a substantial variance to address severity | Affirmed: sentence was substantively reasonable; district court gave meaningful consideration to § 3553(a) and the variance was within discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (standard of review for Guidelines interpretation and sentencing process)
- United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (abuse‑of‑discretion standard for reasonableness review)
- United States v. Brown, 578 F.3d 221 (3d Cir.) (plain‑language construction of the Guidelines)
- Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (deference to district court sentencing when record shows consideration of § 3553(a) factors)
- United States v. Langford, 516 F.3d 205 (3d Cir.) (district court may disregard Guidelines as too severe where clear from record)
- United States v. Calabretta, 831 F.3d 128 (3d Cir.) (career‑offender status changes the sentencing benchmark and framework)