United States v. Mark Manuel, Jr.
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 20987
3rd Cir.2013Background
- Manuel pled guilty in 2004 to mail fraud and conspiracy to commit mail fraud; sentenced to 71 months' imprisonment and three years' supervised release.
- Jurisdiction over his supervised release transferred to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; Manuel repeatedly violated release conditions (positive drug tests; prohibited self-employment soliciting funds).
- After further violations while in a residential reentry center, the district court issued a warrant and held revocation proceedings in 2012.
- At the July 26, 2012 revocation hearing Manuel requested to proceed pro se; the court conducted a colloquy, warned him of disadvantages, and allowed standby counsel.
- Manuel represented himself at subsequent hearings, was found in violation, and was sentenced to two consecutive 16-month terms (32 months total).
- Manuel appealed, arguing the district court’s colloquy was inadequate to establish a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel at the revocation hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Manuel's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court’s colloquy sufficed to permit Manuel to waive counsel at a supervised-release revocation hearing | Colloquy was inadequate under Peppers; waiver not knowing and voluntary | Peppers applies to criminal prosecutions only; plain totality-of-the-circumstances test governs revocation hearings | Waiver was knowing and voluntary under the totality-of-the-circumstances standard; affirm |
| Proper legal standard for waiver of counsel at revocation hearings | Peppers (14-question framework) should control | Revocation hearings are not criminal prosecutions; use totality-of-the-circumstances to assess Rule 32.1 waiver | Adopted totality-of-the-circumstances standard used by sister circuits; Peppers not required |
| Degree of required colloquy or formality when defendant waives rights under Rule 32.1 | Court must conduct a Peppers-like, specific inquiry | No rigid or magic-word colloquy; court should advise of rights and consequences | No specific script required; sufficient warnings and inquiry satisfy due process |
| Standard of appellate review for claimed inadequate colloquy | (Manuel) plenary review should apply | (Gov’t) plain-error because no contemporaneous objection | Court applied plenary review and found no error regardless |
Key Cases Cited
- Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (defendant has Sixth Amendment right to represent oneself; waiver must be knowing and voluntary)
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation is not a criminal prosecution; due process required but full criminal panoply does not apply)
- Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (no absolute constitutional right to counsel at parole revocation; counsel consideration required)
- United States v. Peppers, 302 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 2002) (Peppers 14-question framework for Faretta waivers in criminal prosecutions)
- United States v. Hodges, 460 F.3d 646 (5th Cir. 2006) (adopts totality-of-the-circumstances standard for waivers at revocation hearings)
- United States v. Correa-Torres, 326 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2003) (totality test applied to Rule 32.1 waivers)
- United States v. LeBlanc, 175 F.3d 511 (7th Cir. 1999) (same: no rigid colloquy required; evaluate totality)
- United States v. Booker, 684 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2012) (standard of review discussion for waiver determinations)