United States v. Mark Kuhrt, 788 F.3d 403

Background

Mark Kuhrt and Gilbert Lopez were senior accountants at companies controlled by Allen Stanford; they were convicted after a five-week trial of nine counts of wire fraud and conspiracy for helping conceal Stanford’s multibillion-dollar Ponzi scheme.
Government evidence included emails, spreadsheets, internal reports, and witness testimony (notably James Davis, a cooperating co-conspirator), showing involvement in sham transactions ("private equity flips"), false accounting entries, and omission of shareholder loans from disclosures.
Key disputed factual points at trial: whether Kuhrt and Lopez controlled or were responsible for the content/accuracy of SIB’s annual reports and whether they knowingly participated in or concealed the fraud.
The district court calculated offense levels based on over $2 billion in loss (triggering a 30-level enhancement), applied enhancements for perjury and abuse of a position of trust, denied a minor-role reduction, and imposed below-Guidelines 240-month sentences (down from an advisory life sentence).
On appeal, defendants raised challenges to: a Batson peremptory-strike ruling, sufficiency of the evidence (specific intent and conspiracy), the deliberate-ignorance jury instruction, exclusion of accounting-expert testimony, loss and guideline calculations, and substantive reasonableness of sentences.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Batson challenge to government’s peremptory strike of a Hispanic juror	Lopez argued the strike was race-based because juror and defendant were both Hispanic	Government offered race-neutral reasons (gregariousness, occupation, perceived bias); district court credited them	Court upheld district court; no Batson error (defer to trial-court credibility)
Sufficiency of evidence for wire fraud and conspiracy	Kuhrt/Lopez: evidence fails to show specific intent to defraud or an agreement; some documentary items (e.g., footnote) are ambiguous	Government: Davis and other witnesses plus documents show both knowledge and active steps to conceal fraud (sham transactions, tracking spreadsheets, IB5s, emails)	Evidence sufficient; jury could reasonably find specific intent and conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt
Jury instruction on deliberate ignorance	Defendants: instruction inappropriate and may lower mens rea standard; case centered on actual knowledge	Government: instruction proper as alternative theory; even if error, there was substantial evidence of actual knowledge	Any error harmless because strong evidence of actual knowledge; instruction did not warrant reversal
Exclusion of accounting-expert testimony	Defendants: experts would explain roles/responsibilities, accounting duties, and show no duty to blow the whistle—essential to defense	Government: experts impermissibly opined on defendants’ actual knowledge, responsibility, or legal/ethical duties; trial court limited testimony under Rule 702 and 704(b)	Some exclusions were erroneous but harmless—experts could not have overcome the government’s direct evidence of active participation
Sentencing: loss calculation, guidelines enhancements, and substantive reasonableness	Defendants: court overstated loss, should credit alleged repayments, gain should be used if loss indeterminate, perjury/role/trust enhancements improper, sentences substantively excessive vs cooperators	Government: loss is the SIB funds misappropriated (>$2B), repayments were illusory, foreseeability and role/supporting evidence justify enhancements; downward variance already given	Court affirmed: loss estimate reasonable, enhancements proper or harmless if error, district court’s 240-month sentences reasonable and not substantively unreasonable

Key Cases Cited

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (peremptory-strike Batson framework and deference to trial-court credibility)
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for sufficiency review)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (trial-court gatekeeping under Rule 702 for expert testimony)
United States v. Grossman, 117 F.3d 255 (5th Cir. 1997) (reasonable interpretation of contract language can negate fraudulent intent)
United States v. Mendoza-Medina, 346 F.3d 121 (5th Cir. 2003) (cautionary principles and limits on deliberate-ignorance instruction)