United States v. Marion Norwood, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 6508

Norwood was convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit bank fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1344, 1349) based on a counterfeit-check scheme tied to an Atlanta ring; his role was as a check maker operating primarily in the Kansas City area.
Trial evidence included Postal Inspection Service investigation, cooperating witnesses, testimony about recruitment of homeless cashers, text messages coordinating counterfeit checks, and evidence tying Norwood to creation/pickup of counterfeit checks.
Counsel filed an Anders brief raising sufficiency of the evidence, admissibility of certain prior-act evidence, and sentencing enhancements; Norwood filed a pro se brief raising recusal, sentencing enhancements, and ineffective assistance of counsel.
At sentencing Judge Phillips (who had been U.S. Attorney before March 2012) questioned potential conflict because the broader Atlanta ring had been investigated since 2010; the government clarified that investigation and prosecution specific to Norwood postdated her term.
The district court rejected Norwood’s recusal request, sustained some Guidelines objections (victim count and intended loss reductions), adopted other enhancements (sophisticated means, unauthorized ID use, leadership), calculated a 140–175 month advisory range, and imposed 144 months’ imprisonment and restitution of $275,747.34.

Issue	Norwood's Argument	Government/District Court Argument	Held
Sufficiency of the evidence for conspiracy conviction	Evidence was insufficient to prove his role as a check maker in the conspiracy	Trial evidence (investigators, cooperators, texts, checks) sufficed to prove participation	Affirmed: evidence sufficient
Admissibility of prior-act / 404(b) evidence	Prior events were unfairly prejudicial and not admissible	Prior acts were probative to show scheme, identity, and intent and properly admitted under Rule 404(b)	Affirmed: 404(b) evidence admissible
Judicial recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455 and due process	Judge Phillips should have recused due to prior service as U.S. Attorney and investigation overlap	Phillips did not personally participate in Norwood’s investigation/prosecution; relevant proceedings postdated her tenure; no reasonable basis for impartiality doubt	Affirmed: recusal not required; no due process violation
Sentencing enhancements and substantive reasonableness	Challenges to enhancements (sophisticated means, ID use, leadership) and overall sentence reasonableness	District court made fact findings not clearly erroneous; guideline application proper; sentence within advisory range and reasonable	Affirmed: enhancements and 144-month sentence upheld; ineffective-assistance claims left to § 2255 proceedings

United States v. Maxwell, 778 F.3d 719 (8th Cir. 2015) (sufficiency standard)
United States v. Beckman, 787 F.3d 466 (8th Cir. 2015) (admission of Rule 404(b) evidence)
United States v. Jenkins, 578 F.3d 745 (8th Cir. 2009) (guidelines fact‑finding clear‑error review)
United States v. Di Pasquale, 864 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1988) (recusal requires actual participation as counsel in the specific matter)
United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1988) (same principle on former government official participation)
Barry v. United States, 528 F.2d 1094 (7th Cir. 1976) (interpretation of former § 455 and meaning of a "case")
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016) (due process requires recusal when judge had significant, personal prosecutorial involvement)
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988) (appellate review of counsel‑filed Anders brief)
United States v. Davies, 583 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir. 2009) (ineffective-assistance claims ordinarily addressed on collateral review)