United States v. Marin-Echeverri, 846 F.3d 473

Background

Defendant Hernando Marín‑Echeverri pled guilty to (1) conspiracy to import ≥1 kg heroin and (2) conspiracy to launder proceeds; government dismissed a third count.
Plea agreement included Sentencing Guidelines worksheets calculating total offense level 34 (assuming Criminal History I) and a mutual recommendation to ask the court for a sentence at the lower end of the "applicable guideline range determined by the Court."
The PSR recalculated offense level as 37 (applying U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(a)(1) and leadership adjustment) and placed Marín in Criminal History Category III; defense counsel challenged the PSR calculation but not the criminal history category.
At sentencing the district court adopted the PSR, producing a guidelines range of 262–327 months; the court sentenced Marín to 262 months (the low end of the court‑determined range).
Marín appealed, claiming the government breached the plea agreement by not advocating for the worksheet range (or for a lower offense level) and separately asserted ineffective assistance of counsel; the First Circuit affirms the sentence and dismisses ineffective‑assistance claim without prejudice to collateral review.

Issues

Issue	Marín's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether the government breached the plea agreement by not advocating for the worksheet guideline range	Plea bound government to recommend a sentence based on the worksheet offense level (34) or at least to a range tied to that level (allowing variance only for criminal history)	Agreement expressly left criminal history unspecified and promised only a recommendation for the low end of the "applicable guideline range determined by the Court"; prosecutor must also be candid with the court about correct facts	No breach: agreement read to require recommendation at the low end of whatever guideline range the court determines; government did not impermissibly undercut the plea and properly answered court questions regarding facts and calculations
Whether the AUSA’s factual answers or failure to oppose the PSR adjustments violated the plea	AUSA’s responses and lack of opposition effectively reneged on the agreement	Prosecutors must provide accurate information to the court; distinguishing between answering questions/bringing facts forward and affirmatively supporting an adjustment	No breach: providing correct factual information and calculations is required; not a breach to acknowledge PSR calculations
Whether defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance in negotiating the plea and at sentencing	Counsel misunderstood guidelines, failed to recognize the §2S1.1(a)(1) calculation and leadership enhancement, and thus misadvised Marín	Claim is premature on direct appeal; record is inadequate to evaluate counsel’s strategic choices and reasons	Ineffective‑assistance claim dismissed without prejudice to §2255 collateral review (not resolved on the merits)
Whether plain‑error review should relieve Marín of the waiver/failure‑to‑press argument in district court	Argues plain error because plea language reasonably read to fix offense level from worksheets	Government says waiver bars appeal; court need not resolve waiver because outcome clear on merits	Court declines to find plain error; plea language does not plainly bind gov’t to worksheet offense level and no breach shown

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Gall, 829 F.3d 64 (1st Cir.) (context for plea‑colloquy and sentencing record review)
United States v. Marchena‑Silvestre, 802 F.3d 196 (1st Cir.) (contract principles for interpreting plea agreements)
United States v. Almonte‑Núñez, 771 F.3d 84 (1st Cir.) (prosecutor’s obligation to be candid at sentencing; difference between answering questions and advocating adjustments)
Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129 (U.S.) (plain‑error review principles in plea‑agreement context)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S.) (two‑prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
United States v. Sánchez‑Maldonado, 737 F.3d 826 (1st Cir.) (declining to resolve waiver where merits plainly dictate affirmance)