United States v. Margheim
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 20715
| 10th Cir. | 2014Background
- Terry Margheim was convicted on five counts of a drug- and firearm-related conspiracy and sentenced to 132 months, challenging statutory and constitutional speedy-trial rights.
- A 2008 Colorado firearms/narcotics investigation yielded a multi-defendant indictment; Margheim’s conduct included undercover firearm and methamphetamine transactions linked to the conspiracy.
- Key pretrial events include Margheim’s July 14, 2010 initial appearance, and a series of ends-of-justice continuances culminating in a 120-day exclusion granted August 3, 2010.
- A superseding indictment was filed August 11, 2010; substantial motions practice followed through 2011, with new counsel for Margheim and extensive filing activity.
- A suppression motion filed February 9, 2011, its withdrawal November 21, 2011, and subsequent pro se and counseled filings shaped the timing leading to trial.
- The district court held that the Speedy Trial Act was not violated after aggregating exclusions; the Sixth Amendment speedy-trial claim was resolved against Margheim after Barker balancing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the delay between initial appearance and last codefendant’s appearance was reasonable under §3161(h)(6). | Margheim says delay was unreasonable. | Government argues Vogl factors support exclusion. | Ten-month delay deemed reasonable; exclusion proper. |
| Whether the number of nonexcludable days exceeded seventy under the Act. | Margheim contends more days were nonexcludable. | Government calculates 288 excludable days; remaining nonexcludable days within limit. | 68 nonexcludable days; no ACT violation. |
| Whether the district court double-counted the 120-day ends-of-justice continuance. | Margheim asserts double counting affected calculations. | Any error does not affect timely commencement of trial. | Even if counted twice, outcome unchanged; ACT upheld. |
| Whether Margheim was deprived of Sixth Amendment speedy-trial rights. | Delay was prejudicial; violation of Barker factors. | Barker balancing favors government; delay not prejudicial under test. | No Sixth Amendment violation; conviction affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Henderson v. United States, 9 476 U.S. 321 (U.S. Supreme Court 1986) (defining advisement and exclusions under the Act)
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (U.S. Supreme Court 1972) (four-factor speedy-trial balancing test)
- Toombs, 574 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2009) (Barker factors and delays; emphasis on defendant conduct)
- Williams, 511 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007) (motion-under-advisement exclusions; 30-day rule)
- Seltzer, 595 F.3d 1170 (10th Cir. 2010) (prejudice and Barker factors in Sixth Amendment context)
- Gomez, 67 F.3d 1515 (10th Cir. 1995) (remedial framework for speedy-trial dismissal)
- Gordon, 710 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2013) (tolling and ends-of-justice continuances)
- Abdush-Shakur, 465 F.3d 458 (10th Cir. 2006) (discretion in dismissal under the Act)