United States v. Marek Stanislawczyk
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 19490
| 7th Cir. | 2016Background
- FBI confidential informant recorded conversations showing defendants (Wrobel, Stanislawczyk, Oziemski) planned to travel from Chicago to New York to rob Jacob Reichman, believed to be a diamond merchant carrying millions in diamonds.
- Defendants discussed logistics (renting a van with NY plates, disguises, pry bar, gloves) and intent to sell stolen diamonds to a known buyer; FBI supervised van rental and equipped it with recording device.
- Defendants were arrested in New Jersey en route; evidence seized included gloves, a pry bar, and disguises.
- Indictment charged conspiracy and attempt to obstruct commerce by robbery under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a); later extortion allegations were dismissed before trial.
- Government offered expert testimony (Strzepek) about the diamond trade (diamonds mined abroad; dealers often carry gems on their person) to establish interstate-commerce nexus and rebut argument that plots were fantasy.
- Jury convicted defendants on two Hobbs Act counts; defendants appealed challenging (1) sufficiency of interstate-commerce nexus, (2) admission of expert testimony, and (3) adequacy of allocution for Stanislawczyk.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency: interstate-commerce nexus under Hobbs Act | Government: attempted robbery of a diamond merchant implicated interstate commerce because diamonds are products of foreign commerce and robbery would deplete assets used in interstate trade | Defendants: no proof victim was engaged in interstate commerce; at most an individual robbery that wouldn’t affect commerce (relying on Mattson) | Affirmed. Attempt liability requires only realistic probability; defendants intended to rob a diamond merchant and would have depleted assets tied to foreign commerce, so nexus proven. |
| Expert testimony admissibility (Rule 401/403) | Government: Strzepek’s specialized knowledge was relevant to interstate-commerce element and to rebut fantasy-defense | Defendants: testimony irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial (implied Reichman was a merchant) | Affirmed. District court did not abuse discretion; testimony relevant and probative value not substantially outweighed by prejudice; court limited scope to avoid misleading jury. |
| Right of allocution (Rule 32) for pro se defendant | Government: district court addressed defendant and permitted allocution | Stanislawczyk: sentencing court failed to provide meaningful opportunity and should have clarified dual roles when pro se | Affirmed. Court personally addressed defendant, record shows extensive allocution; no procedural error or prejudice from proceeding pro se. |
| Standard of review for sufficiency challenge | Government: jury verdict should stand under deferential standard; plain-error review applies because defendants failed to raise below | Defendants: contest sufficiency on appeal | Affirmed. Even under plain-error or ordinary sufficiency review, evidence was sufficient. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Bailey, 227 F.3d 792 (7th Cir.) (attempt requires realistic probability of effect on commerce)
- United States v. Harty, 930 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir.) (depletion-of-assets theory links robbery to interstate commerce)
- United States v. Mattson, 671 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir.) (distinguishable extortion decision relied on by defendants)
- United States v. Mitov, 460 F.3d 901 (7th Cir.) (factual impossibility not a defense to attempt; plain-error review discussion)
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (gatekeeping standard for expert testimony)
- United States v. Williams, 258 F.3d 669 (7th Cir.) (what constitutes addressing defendant personally for allocution)