United States v. Marcus Durham, 922 F.3d 845

Marcus Durham had supervised release after a conviction for conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base; the district court revoked release and sentenced him to 30 additional months.
A magistrate judge originally found Durham "financially unable to retain counsel" under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b); the court appointed counsel, who later withdrew with permission.
Durham was represented by retained counsel at the revocation hearing; after the hearing retained counsel withdrew and Durham filed a pro se motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) on appeal.
The district court denied Durham’s IFP request for an incomplete financial affidavit and later denied a renewed IFP request (filed by the Federal Defender) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) / Fed. R. App. P. 24, reasoning Durham had $750 in his account and could pay the $505 filing fee; the court also deemed the appeal frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3).
The Seventh Circuit considered whether the Criminal Justice Act (18 U.S.C. § 3006A), not the general IFP statute (28 U.S.C. § 1915), governs appointment of counsel and IFP treatment for appeals from supervised-release revocations.
The court granted Durham leave to proceed IFP on appeal under the Criminal Justice Act, holding § 3006A controls and § 1915 standards (including frivolity screening) should not have dictated the district court’s denial.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Which statutory standard governs appointment of counsel and IFP for appeals from supervised-release revocations?	Durham: Criminal Justice Act (§ 3006A) governs; he is financially unable to obtain counsel.	District court applied general IFP statute (§ 1915) and Fed. R. App. P. 24 standards.	Held: § 3006A controls; § 1915 standards should not have been applied.
May a district court deny appointment/IFP by finding the appeal frivolous under § 1915 screening?	Durham: § 1915(e)(2) screening and frivolity dismissal do not apply to CJA contexts; Anders procedures govern counsel conduct.	District court relied on § 1915(a)(3) to deem the appeal frivolous and deny IFP.	Held: District court erred to rely on § 1915 frivolity screening; CJA lacks that dismissal mechanism and appellate court, not district court, decides frivolousness on merits.
Role of Anders procedures where counsel believes appeal is frivolous in supervised-release revocation appeals	Durham (and CJA-appointed counsel): Anders procedures are appropriate and should be followed if counsel deems appeal frivolous.	District court did not apply Anders; treated case under § 1915 screening.	Held: Anders procedures are appropriate as a matter of circuit practice for these revocation appeals; counsel should follow Anders if seeking withdrawal.

Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2007) (discusses limits on appointment/recruitment of counsel for civil litigants)
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (Sixth Amendment limits and probation/parole revocation procedures)
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (procedures when appointed counsel finds appeal frivolous)
United States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2016) (applying Anders procedures in revocation contexts)
United States v. Martin-Trigona, 684 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1982) (CJA standard for financial inability to obtain counsel)
United States v. Kelly, 467 F.2d 262 (7th Cir. 1972) (CJA coverage for revocation proceedings)
United States v. Dangdee, 608 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1979) (treating CJA as controlling over § 1915 for criminal matters)
United States v. Osuna, 141 F.3d 1412 (10th Cir. 1998) (CJA governs appointment; frivolity determination for criminal appeals belongs to court of appeals)
United States v. Boutwell, 896 F.2d 884 (5th Cir. 1990) (contrary view regarding interplay of § 1915 and CJA)