United States v. Marcel King, 736 F.3d 805

Background

King was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
The Fourth Amendment issue is whether a suspicionless search of a probationer’s residence is permissible when the probation agreement contains a suspicionless-search condition.
King’s probation agreement authorized warrantless searches of his person, property, premises and vehicle any time, with or without probable cause, by any peace, parole or probation officer.
San Francisco police searched King’s residence and found an unloaded shotgun; suppression motion was denied; bench trial proceeded with stipulated testimony for appellate preservation.
En banc review overruled Baker; the panel then addressed whether the search was constitutional under Knights and Samson given lack of individualized reasonable suspicion.
The majority held that the suspicionless search was reasonable based on King’s diminished privacy expectation and substantial governmental interests in probation supervision.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a suspicionless search of a probationer’s residence can be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when the probation condition does not expressly authorize searches without any suspicion.	King argues the clause permits no-suspicion searches and thus is constitutionally valid under Knights/Samson.	The government contends the condition, read with Samson/Knights, sufficiently diminishes privacy when coupled with probation.	Yes; the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Whether King’s probation search condition clearly permitted searches without any suspicion (i.e., without reasonable suspicion).	King’s wording (“without probable cause”) signals authority to search without any particular level of suspicion.	The condition did not unambiguously authorize searches without any suspicion; it contemplated limited suspicion standards.	The majority found the condition significantly diminished privacy; permitted under totality of circumstances.
Whether King’s status as a probationer versus parolee affects the balancing of privacy interests and governmental interests for warrantsless searches.	Probationers have reduced privacy interests but not to the extent to allow completely suspicionless searches; balancing supports reasonableness here.	Probationers retain greater privacy than parolees; the government interests do not warrant pure suspicionless searches absent clearly delineated conditions.	Probationer status is properly weighed to permit suspicionless search under the condition here; the search was reasonable.

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (U.S. 2001) (upholds probation search with broad authorization; balancing test for reasonableness)
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (U.S. 2006) (parolees may be searched without cause; probationers have greater privacy expectations)
United States v. Baker, 658 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 2011) (previously held that probationers’ suspicionless searches could be allowed; overruled by en banc King)
People v. Woods, 21 Cal.4th 668 (Cal. 1999) (California case approving broad probation search consent; discussed in initial state-law context)
People v. Bravo, 43 Cal.3d 600 (Cal. 1987) (probation search condition interpreted under California law; consent/waiver considerations)
King, United States v., 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012) (en banc remand overruling Baker; clarifies Fourth Amendment analysis for probation searches)