United States v. Marc Willy, 40 F.4th 1074

On May 12, 2019 two nearby residents separately called police after a man in a green truck (identified by plate as registered to Marc Willy) approached them, claimed he had been kidnapped and was looking for the place where he had been held, and displayed a semiautomatic pistol; one witness said Willy racked the slide.
Deputy Curtis Thaxton located the truck, conducted a high‑risk stop, saw Willy’s holstered pistol while ordering him out, removed the gun, handcuffed Willy, and arrested him. Thaxton later recovered a short‑barrel shotgun from the truck and a modified CO2 cartridge (ruled a destructive device by ATF) from Willy.
State charges under Wash. Rev. Code § 9.41.270 and alteration of a serial number were pursued; federal indictment charged making/possessing an improvised destructive device under 26 U.S.C. § 5861.
Willy moved to suppress evidence seized after the arrest. The district court held Thaxton had reasonable suspicion to stop but lacked probable cause to arrest under § 9.41.270, suppressed the post‑arrest evidence, and the government appealed.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed: it applied Washington precedents construing § 9.41.270 narrowly (so open carry is presumptively lawful) and held the two citizen reports, though reliable, did not provide probable cause to believe Willy’s display ‘‘warranted alarm for the safety of other persons.’’ The exclusionary rule applied to suppress the seized firearms, CO2 device, and statements.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Government)	Defendant's Argument (Willy)	Held
Probable cause to arrest under RCW 9.41.270(1) — "warrants alarm" clause	Two consistent, verified citizen reports that Willy displayed and racked a pistol while rambling about kidnapping gave probable cause to arrest for displaying a firearm in a manner warranting alarm	Reports showed no threats, no pointing, and only odd/rambling behavior; at most reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop, not probable cause for arrest	Held: No probable cause to arrest; officer had reasonable suspicion to detain but needed further inquiry before arresting
Proper interpretation/scope of RCW 9.41.270(1)	The statute covers displays that objectively warrant alarm; the facts here met that objective standard	The statute must be narrowly construed (consistent with Washington cases) — mere display in open‑carry jurisdiction is insufficient absent threatening or alarming circumstances	Held: Court adopts Washington courts’ narrow construction: clause applies where conduct objectively poses a threat or would warrant alarm to a reasonable person; that standard not met on these facts
Application of exclusionary rule to post‑arrest evidence	Evidence and statements following the unlawful arrest are fruits of the poisonous tree and should be suppressed	Same — suppression appropriate	Held: Suppression affirmed for firearms, CO2 device, and statements (government did not contest exclusion)

Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) (standards for reviewing reasonable suspicion and probable cause; give due weight to inferences of officers)
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (probable cause as practical, common‑sense probability)
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964) (probable cause standard for warrantless arrest)
Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) (limitations on anonymous tip reliability)
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (fruits of the poisonous tree and exclusionary rule)
State v. Maciolek, 676 P.2d 996 (Wash. 1984) (Washington Supreme Court narrows "warrants alarm" language to conduct posing a threat)
State v. Spencer, 876 P.2d 939 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (adopts reasonable‑person standard; examples of objectively alarming displays)
United States v. Brown, 925 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2019) (open‑carry context: report of a gun alone did not create reasonable suspicion in Washington)
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (probable cause evaluated from viewpoint of objectively reasonable officer)