United States v. Manuel Melgar-Diaz, 2 F.4th 1263

Two Mexican nationals (Manuel Melgar‑Diaz and Joaquin Benito‑Mendoza) entered the U.S. away from ports of entry (arrested about 5 and 18 miles from ports, respectively).
Both pleaded guilty without agreements to misdemeanor illegal entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1); each was sentenced to time served and released.
Defendants appealed, raising constitutional challenges to § 1325(a)(1): a non‑delegation challenge (that immigration officers have unfettered power to designate times/places) and vagueness (lack of notice/arbitrary enforcement).
The district court rejected the challenges; the Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed: § 1325(a)(1) does not violate the non‑delegation doctrine and is not unconstitutionally vague (both as‑applied and facially, given the defendants’ conduct was within the statute’s core).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Non‑delegation: whether §1325(a)(1) unlawfully delegates legislative power to immigration officers	§1325(a)(1) criminalizes entering except at times/places designated by officers; any delegation is narrow/interstitial and guided by statutory context and existing immigration authority	§1325(a)(1) lets officers effectively create crimes by designating entry points with no governing standards (could designate all or none)	Rejected. Statute supplies an intelligible principle; delegation is ministerial/interstitial and fits within executive immigration authority.
Vagueness: whether §1325(a)(1) is unconstitutionally vague (as‑applied or facial)	The statute gives fair notice (entry outside designated ports) and existing rules/ports provide standards; defendants’ entries were plainly prohibited	Statute lacks sufficient notice and permits arbitrary enforcement because officers have unbounded discretion to designate times/places	Rejected. As‑applied and facial challenges fail; defendants’ conduct fell in the statute’s core and statute provides adequate notice and guidance to prevent arbitrary enforcement.

Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019) (modern non‑delegation framework and intelligible‑principle analysis)
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (intelligible‑principle standard supports delegations to executive)
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001) (degree of acceptable agency discretion varies with scope of power)
Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991) (upholding delegation that allowed executive designation with criminal consequences)
Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996) (executive’s independent authority over subject matter can permit broader delegation)
United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950) (executive exclusion of aliens rests on inherent executive authority; no improper delegation)
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (vagueness doctrine principles under the Due Process Clause)
United States v. Aldana, 878 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2017) (interpreting §1325(a)(1) and ports‑of‑entry concept)
Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018) (guilty pleas do not forfeit the right to raise certain constitutional challenges on appeal)
Kashem v. Barr, 941 F.3d 358 (9th Cir. 2019) (vagueness analysis: notice and arbitrary‑enforcement inquiries)