889 F.3d 950
8th Cir.2018Background
- Manuel Sanchez-Rojas pleaded guilty to unlawful reentry after a prior aggravated-felony conviction, in violation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and 1326(b)(2).
- District court applied U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a) base offense level 8, then added +8 under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) because of prior convictions for an "aggravated felony," and gave a -3 adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, producing total offense level 13 and criminal-history category V.
- The § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) enhancement relied on treating Sanchez-Rojas’s California burglary convictions (Cal. Penal Code § 459) as an "aggravated felony" by reference to the INA definition, which incorporates a "crime of violence" as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (the residual clause).
- After briefing, the Supreme Court declared § 16(b) void for vagueness in Sessions v. Dimaya; Sanchez-Rojas argued this required remand to remove the § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C) enhancement.
- The Eighth Circuit declined to apply Dimaya to invalidate the Guidelines enhancement, relying on Beckles v. United States and reasoning that advisory Guidelines incorporating a statutory residual clause are not subject to a vagueness challenge under the Due Process Clause.
- Sanchez-Rojas’s alternative challenge that his sentence was substantively unreasonable was rejected: the district court weighed § 3553(a) factors and imposed a within-Guidelines sentence at the top of the range.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2L1.2(b)(1)(C)’s aggravated-felony enhancement is void for vagueness because it incorporates 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) | Sanchez-Rojas: § 16(b) is void for vagueness (Dimaya), so the enhancement cannot stand | Government: Beckles forecloses vagueness challenges to advisory Guidelines; no meaningful difference when Guideline incorporates statutory language | Court: Affirmed enhancement; Beckles bars due-process vagueness challenge to advisory Guidelines incorporation of § 16(b) |
| Whether California burglary qualifies as a "crime of violence" under § 16(a) or § 16(b) for the enhancement | Sanchez-Rojas: California burglary is not generic burglary and thus doesn't qualify under § 16(a); § 16(b) is void | Government: § 16(b) (residual clause) applied to make the offenses qualify | Court: Government conceded § 16(a) does not apply; court sustained enhancement via Guidelines incorporation despite § 16(b) vagueness issue |
| Whether the sentence was substantively unreasonable | Sanchez-Rojas: District court undervalued mitigation (acceptance, family, minimal recent history) | Government: Court properly balanced § 3553(a) factors against extensive criminal history, prior deportations, threats to officers | Court: No abuse of discretion; within-Guidelines sentence reasonable |
| Remedy after Dimaya | Sanchez-Rojas: Remand for resentencing without enhancement | Government: No remand; Beckles controls | Court: No remand; enhancement stands |
Key Cases Cited
- Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017) (advisory Sentencing Guidelines are not subject to vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (18 U.S.C. § 16(b) residual clause is unconstitutionally vague)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (struck down identically worded ACCA residual clause as void for vagueness)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (appellate review of sentencing; within-Guidelines sentence may be presumed reasonable)
- Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013) (conviction under Cal. Penal Code § 459 is never generic burglary)