United States v. Mansa Baptist, 759 F.3d 690

Background

Mansa N. Baptist, a Belize native and lawful permanent resident since 1988, was convicted of controlled-substance offenses in 1995 and 1996 and was placed in removal proceedings in 1998.
On October 22, 1998, Baptist signed a bilingual stipulated removal order (8 C.F.R. § 1003.25(b)) waiving counsel, a personal hearing before an IJ, and appeal; the IJ reviewed the written record and ordered removal; Baptist did not appeal or seek reopening.
Baptist was deported to Belize in November 1998, repeatedly reentered the U.S. illegally, was removed several more times, and was ultimately arrested in 2010; he was indicted under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) for unlawful reentry after removal.
In a conditional guilty plea, Baptist reserved the right to challenge his 1998 removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d), arguing the stipulated removal was not a knowing and voluntary waiver of due process (no counsel, did not read form, no IJ appearance) and that he was prejudiced because he might have obtained relief under former INA § 212(c).
The district court denied the motion to dismiss, finding the 1998 stipulated removal was knowingly and voluntarily executed (form in his native language, explicit written acknowledgments, IJ’s finding) and that Baptist suffered no prejudice because his convictions rendered him ineligible for § 212(c) or cancellation of removal under the law in effect at the time.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed: it held Baptist failed to prove a due process violation or resulting prejudice and therefore failed to meet § 1326(d)’s requirement to collaterally attack the prior removal.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 1998 stipulated removal was a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of due process rights	Baptist: He never read the form, had no counsel, and had no IJ appearance or oral explanation, so waiver was not knowing/voluntary	Government: Form was in Baptist’s native language, explicitly described rights and waivers, IJ found waiver knowing and voluntary	Held: Waiver was valid; Baptist failed to prove a due process violation
Whether Baptist suffered prejudice from the removal (i.e., could he have obtained relief)	Baptist: If properly advised or represented, he could have sought relief under former INA § 212(c)	Government: Baptist’s convictions (trial convictions) made him ineligible for § 212(c) and for cancellation; law at the time bars relief	Held: No prejudice; Baptist was ineligible for § 212(c) and cancellation, so error (if any) did not likely affect outcome
Whether Baptist exhausted administrative remedies and was denied opportunity for judicial review under § 1326(d)	Baptist: He was unaware of rights because he didn’t read the form and lacked counsel, so exhaustion should be excused	Government: He waived appeal in the signed form and did not pursue reopening or appeals	Held: Court did not need to reach exhaustion because fundamental-fairness showing failed; in any event, he did not exhaust remedies

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Arita-Campos, 607 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 2010) (standard of review and burden for § 1326(d) collateral attacks)
United States v. Santiago-Ochoa, 447 F.3d 1015 (7th Cir. 2006) (fundamental-fairness requires due-process violation plus prejudice)
United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987) (aliens may collaterally attack prior deportation orders in criminal prosecutions)
United States v. Ramos, 623 F.3d 672 (9th Cir. 2010) (stated waiver invalid where translation/oral explanation inadequate)
I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (limited availability of § 212(c) relief after statutory changes)
Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035 (7th Cir. 2004) (§ 212(c) relief unavailable to defendants who went to trial after statute change)
United States v. Espinoza-Farlo, 34 F.3d 469 (7th Cir. 1994) (prejudice requirement for fundamental-unfairness showing)
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135 (1945) (heightened procedural care when depriving liberty)
Alimi v. Gonzales, 489 F.3d 829 (7th Cir. 2007) (prejudice assessed by whether error likely affected proceeding outcome)