United States v. Manor
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 1460
| 1st Cir. | 2011Background
- Manor, a convicted felon, was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition after a theater confrontation led to a chase and arrest.
- Adrien identified Manor as the gunman who flashed a silver handgun at him in the Loews theater lobby.
- Caisey tracked Manor from the theater, observed him on Tamworth Street, and later arrested him after a chase.
- Linscott, an Emerson College security officer, also witnessed Manor with a stainless-steel gun during the Tamworth confrontation and helped arrest him.
- A loaded stainless-steel gun was recovered underneath a car where Manor had sought cover, matching the gun Adrien described.
- Manor was convicted at trial; he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and alleged prosecutorial misconduct on appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for possession | Manor argues the evidence fails to prove possession beyond a reasonable doubt. | Manor contends identities and inferences were improperly drawn from eyewitness testimony. | Evidence could rationally support guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. |
| Prosecutorial misconduct in closing | Manor claims closing misstatements improperly framed identification. | Manor asserts misstatements unfairly prejudiced the defense. | No reversible misconduct; no prejudice shown. |
Key Cases Cited
- Guerra-Garcia, 336 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2003) (review standard for sufficiency)
- Castro-Davis, 612 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 2010) (credibility and standard of review for factual findings)
- Gifford, 17 F.3d 462 (1st Cir. 1994) (judgment need not rule out alternate innocent hypotheses)
- Ortiz, 447 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2006) (reversal rarely occurs on sufficiency review)
- Martinez-Medina, 279 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2002) (prosecutor's closing can argue inferences supported by record)
- De La Paz-Rentas, 613 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2010) (misconduct requires prejudice; standard of review)
- Henderson, 320 F.3d 92 (1st Cir. 2003) (prosecutors may argue reasonable inferences from evidence)
