United States v. Mannie
971 F.3d 1145
| 10th Cir. | 2020Background
- The First Step Act of 2018 ("2018 FSA") made portions of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 ("2010 FSA")—which increased crack-cocaine quantity thresholds—retroactive for offenses committed before Aug. 3, 2010, allowing courts to reduce sentences "as if" the 2010 FSA were in effect.
- Section 404 of the 2018 FSA defines a "covered offense" (penalties modified by 2010 §§2–3 and committed before Aug. 3, 2010) and permits a court, on motion, to reduce a sentence but expressly does not require reduction.
- Arthur Mannie pleaded guilty in 2009 to possession with intent to distribute crack and, as a career offender, received a 262‑month sentence; under the 2010 FSA his guideline range would have been lower (188–235 months). He moved under the 2018 FSA for sentence reduction; the district court denied relief on the merits.
- Michael Maytubby was convicted in 2006 of conspiracy and received concurrent sentences; prior guideline reductions under Amendments 706 and 782 reduced his concurrent sentences, and he sought further reduction under the 2018 FSA. The district court denied relief; on appeal the Tenth Circuit questioned whether any further reduction would actually shorten his incarceration.
- The panel consolidated the appeals and resolved four principal legal questions: who is eligible for relief under §404(a); whether the court’s review is abuse of discretion; whether a hearing is required for an 2018 FSA motion; and whether an appellant has standing when concurrent, non-covered sentences make relief illusory.
- Holding summary: the court affirmed the denial of Mannie’s motion (no abuse of discretion; hearing not required) and dismissed Maytubby’s appeal for lack of Article III standing because reducing his covered sentence would not shorten his actual incarceration.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eligibility for 2018 FSA relief | Movants (Mannie, Maytubby) argued they qualify because convicted under federal statutes whose penalties were modified by 2010 FSA and offenses committed before Aug. 3, 2010 | Government: relief limited by §404(c) but movants who meet statutory definition are eligible | Held: Eligibility requires (1) federal conviction, (2) penalties modified by 2010 §2 or §3, (3) offense before Aug. 3, 2010 — both movants met this test |
| Standing when relief would not reduce incarceration (Maytubby) | Maytubby sought reduction of his covered sentence | Government argued reduction would be illusory because concurrent non-covered sentences would still control incarceration | Held: Dismissed for lack of Article III standing because any reduction would not redress ongoing incarceration |
| Standard of appellate review of district court denial of 2018 FSA motion | Mannie argued review should apply Booker/Gall two-step (procedural + substantive reasonableness) because court exercises sentencing discretion | Government argued (and court agreed) that §3582(c)(1)(B) and §404 grant limited authority and appellate review is for abuse of discretion | Held: Review is for abuse of discretion (not full resentencing standard) |
| Right to a hearing / scope of proceeding | Mannie claimed he was entitled to a hearing and allocution before a sentence-modification decision | Government: neither the 2018 FSA nor §3582(c)(1)(B) requires a hearing; district courts may exercise docket control and hold hearings in their discretion | Held: No statutory right to a hearing; district court may but need not hold one; proceeding is a limited sentence‑modification, not plenary resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Baker, 769 F.3d 1196 (10th Cir. 2014) (§3582(c) limits district court’s authority to modify sentences)
- United States v. Spaulding, 802 F.3d 1110 (10th Cir. 2015) (§3582(c) as jurisdictional limitation)
- United States v. Meyers, 200 F.3d 715 (10th Cir. 2000) (standing requires injury, traceability, redressability)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (constitutional standing principles)
- Lexmark Int’l v. Static Control Components, 572 U.S. 118 (2014) (standing/irreducible constitutional minimum)
- United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (sentencing discretion framework referenced by parties)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (appellate review of sentences — procedural then substantive)
- Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (requirement that sentencing court explain reasoned basis)
- United States v. Rhodes, 549 F.3d 833 (10th Cir. 2008) (distinction between original sentencing and §3582(c) modifications)
- United States v. Lucero, 713 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 2013) (§3582(c) modification is not a resentencing)
- United States v. Bustamante-Conchas, 850 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2017) (allocution at initial sentencing distinct from modification proceedings)
- United States v. Jackson, 945 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2019) (other circuits hold denial of First Step Act motions reviewed for abuse of discretion)