United States v. MANEY, 2:03-cr-00448

Background

Elliot Maney pleaded guilty in federal court (May 6, 2004) to being a felon in possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).
At sentencing, Maney had two pending New Jersey state matters: a related State Gun Case (third-degree unlawful possession of a handgun) and an unrelated State Aggravated Assault Case (second-degree aggravated assault and third-degree weapon possession).
Judge Lifland reduced Maney’s intended 120-month federal sentence by 14 months to account for time in state custody on the related State Gun Case, resulting in a 106-month sentence; the judgment did not state whether the federal sentence would run concurrently or consecutively to state terms.
Maney (pro se) moved under Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 to amend the judgment to reflect an alleged intent that the federal sentence run concurrently with his state sentences, arguing the court applied U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b).
The district court denied relief, holding Rule 36 permits correction of clerical transcription errors only, that the sentencing transcript showed the court used its discretion under § 5G1.3(c)/the complex-situation commentary, and that silence in the judgment means the federal term runs consecutively.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Rule 36 allows changing the judgment to make the federal sentence concurrent with state sentences	Rule 36 only corrects clerical/transcription errors, not substantive or unexpressed judicial intent	Maney: judgment should be amended under Rule 36 to reflect an intended concurrent sentence	Denied — Rule 36 cannot correct substantive or unexpressed intent; no clerical error shown
Whether Judge Lifland applied U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) mandating concurrency when state time is fully accounted for	Government: transcript shows judge used discretion under the complex-situation commentary, not § 5G1.3(b) exclusively	Maney: written judgment language and crediting 14 months indicates application of § 5G1.3(b) requiring concurrency	Denied — sentencing transcript and context show judge applied discretionary complex-situation authority, not an automatic § 5G1.3(b) concurrency
Whether Ruggiano permits retroactive fully concurrent federal sentencing to an unrelated state term	Government: Ruggiano is distinguishable and superseded by later Guidelines amendments	Maney: relies on Ruggiano to argue judge could and did make sentence retroactively concurrent	Denied — Ruggiano inapplicable: there was no oral or written declaration of concurrency and later guidance superseded it
Effect of silence in the written judgment on concurrency/consecutive status	Government: statute governs — absent express order, terms imposed at different times run consecutively	Maney: judgment wording re: credit under § 5G1.3(b) implies concurrent intent	Court: silence means federal term is consecutive by operation of 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a)

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Guevremont, 829 F.2d 423 (3d Cir. 1987) (Rule 36 limited to clerical/transcription errors)
United States v. Bennett, 423 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2005) (Rule 36 does not permit correction of substantive sentencing errors)
United States v. Werber, 51 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 1995) (Rule 36 cannot effectuate unexpressed sentencing intentions)
Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121 (3d Cir. 2002) (sentencing court may order federal sentence retroactively concurrent where judge expressly so orders)
Turnquest v. Allenwood, [citation="643 F. App'x 101"] (3d Cir. 2016) (absence of express order means BOP treats federal sentence as consecutive)