United States v. Malmstrom, 967 F.3d 1

Background

Eric Malmstrom was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for transmitting threatening interstate communications after making numerous threatening calls to the Swedish Embassy and a consular employee, Zandra Bergstedt (over 300 calls; many left on voicemail).
Authorities arrested Malmstrom after he indicated traveling toward Washington and threatening to kill Bergstedt and her children; a federal grand jury returned a four‑count indictment, one count later dropped.
The one‑day trial proceeded in August 2018 on three counts; Malmstrom waived his right to testify, the jury convicted on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to 27 months’ imprisonment plus supervised release with a mental‑health condition.
On appeal (represented by successor counsel), Malmstrom raised a single issue: the district court should have sua sponte ordered a competency hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) given the bizarre, irrational nature of his conduct.
Trial counsel had twice moved to withdraw (one for client preference, one for lack of cooperation), but told the court he could communicate with Malmstrom and could "bring [him] up to speed"; Malmstrom later cooperated, participated in proceedings (including waiving testimony), and testified lucidly at sentencing.
The First Circuit reviewed for abuse of discretion and held the district court did not err in declining to order a competency exam sua sponte because the record lacked reasonable cause to doubt Malmstrom’s ability to understand proceedings or assist counsel.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court erred by failing to order a sua sponte competency hearing under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a).	Malmstrom: his irrational, bizarre offense conduct gave reasonable cause to believe he might be incompetent and required a competency evaluation.	Government/Lower Court: bizarre conduct alone is insufficient; record showed counsel could communicate with Malmstrom and Malmstrom demonstrated understanding and participation in proceedings.	No abuse of discretion. The court lacked "reasonable cause" to doubt competency given counsel's assurances and defendant's demonstrated ability to understand proceedings and assist in his defense.

Key Cases Cited

Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) (due process forbids trial of legally incompetent defendant)
Robidoux v. O'Brien, 643 F.3d 334 (1st Cir. 2011) (competency to stand trial is a functional inquiry focused on ability to understand proceedings and assist counsel)
United States v. Kenney, 756 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2014) (standard of review and competency‑hearing guidance)
United States v. Muriel‑Cruz, 412 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2005) (weight to be given defense counsel’s observations about client competence)
United States v. Brown, 669 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2012) (attorney‑client disagreement does not necessarily show incompetence)
United States v. Ahrendt, 560 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2009) (awareness of possible mental illness alone does not meet "reasonable cause" threshold)
United States v. Nygren, 933 F.3d 76 (1st Cir.) (district court should order competency evaluation when reasonable cause exists)