United States v. Maldonado-Burgos
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 12200
| 1st Cir. | 2017Background
- This case follows the panel decision in United States v. Maldonado-Burgos holding 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a) (the Mann Act provision addressing transport for prostitution/sexual activity) does not cover conduct occurring wholly within Puerto Rico. The government sought rehearing en banc, which was denied.
- The principal legal question is whether Congress intended federal criminal statutes that refer to “Territory” to include Puerto Rico after its 1952 Commonwealth constitution.
- A long-standing First Circuit precedent, Crespo v. United States, held § 2421(a) applied to intra‑Puerto Rico adult sex‑trafficking; the panel in Maldonado‑Burgos rejected that result.
- The dissenting judges (Howard & Lynch) argue the panel decision conflicts with Supreme Court precedent (Examining Board, Sánchez Valle), First Circuit precedents (Villarin Gerena, Moreno Rios, Acosta‑Martinez), statutory developments (PROMESA), and long congressional acquiescence.
- Judge Thompson (concurring in the denial of rehearing) defends application of the Cordova framework (Cordova & Simonpietri) for assessing whether statutes that treat states and territories differently should continue to treat Puerto Rico as a “territory.”
- The dispute has practical consequences for federal enforcement in Puerto Rico (e.g., sex‑trafficking prosecutions and applicability of other federal criminal statutes like the Hobbs Act and related trafficking statutes).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (United States) | Defendant's Argument (Maldonado‑Burgos / panel) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a) applies to sex‑trafficking that occurs wholly within Puerto Rico | Congress used “Territory or Possession” in § 2421(a) and, given precedent and congressional acquiescence (Crespo), § 2421(a) should cover intra‑island adult trafficking | After Puerto Rico’s 1952 status change, statutes that distinguish states and territories should be read to treat Puerto Rico like a state absent specific evidence to the contrary (per Cordova) | Panel held § 2421(a) does not apply to conduct solely within Puerto Rico; rehearing en banc denied (dissent argues this is incorrect) |
| Proper interpretive framework: Examining‑Board–style full‑application presumption vs. Cordova test (require "specific evidence or clear policy reasons") | Use Examining Board and related First Circuit decisions: if a federal statute applied before Commonwealth status, it continues to apply unless Congress clearly intended otherwise | Apply Cordova’s rule: when a statute differentiates states and territories, treat Puerto Rico as like a state unless the statute contains specific evidence or policy reasons to the contrary | Panel applied Cordova and found no specific evidence in § 2421(a) to treat Puerto Rico as a territory; dissenters contend Examining Board framework and prior First Circuit rulings support coverage |
| Effect of later statutory changes and congressional silence (e.g., 1998 amendment referring to “commonwealth”; PROMESA; Congress’ inaction after Crespo) | Congressional silence and selective amendments (adding “commonwealth” to § 2423(a) regarding minors, PROMESA’s definition) support the view that Congress accepted § 2421(a)’s historic coverage of Puerto Rico | The 1998 use of “commonwealth” in § 2423(a) and failure to amend § 2421(a) do not establish a clear intent; legislative record is ambiguous | Panel treated the statutory record as insufficient to show Congress intended § 2421(a) to differ for Puerto Rico; dissent argues silence plus history indicates continued coverage |
| Practical and broader legal consequences (federal enforcement, other statutes) | Interpreting § 2421(a) to exclude intra‑island adult trafficking undermines federal enforcement and produces absurd distinctions (e.g., adult mentally disabled victims), and may threaten other federal statutes’ applicability | Cordova‑based limitations are statute‑specific and do not necessarily doom other federal statutes; absence of clear textual intent controls | Dissenters say consequences warrant en banc / Supreme Court review; panel decision stands after denial of rehearing en banc |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Maldonado‑Burgos, 844 F.3d 339 (1st Cir. 2016) (panel decision at issue holding § 2421(a) does not cover conduct wholly within Puerto Rico)
- Crespo v. United States, 151 F.2d 44 (1st Cir. 1945) (First Circuit precedent holding the Mann Act provision applied to intra‑Puerto Rico adult trafficking)
- Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank N.A., 649 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1981) (articulates test requiring specific evidence or clear policy reasons to treat Puerto Rico as a territory for statutes that differentiate states and territories)
- Examining Bd. of Eng’rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (Supreme Court framework assessing whether federal statutes that applied pre‑Commonwealth continue to apply post‑Commonwealth)
- Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016) (Supreme Court opinion on sovereignty and dual‑sovereignty doctrine bearing on Puerto Rico’s status)
- United States v. Villarin Gerena, 553 F.2d 723 (1st Cir. 1977) (First Circuit applying continuity principles for federal statutes after Commonwealth status)
- Moreno Rios v. United States, 256 F.2d 68 (1st Cir. 1958) (similar First Circuit treatment of post‑Commonwealth statutory application)
- United States v. Acosta‑Martinez, 252 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2001) (applying similar inquiry to determine applicability of a federal statute to Puerto Rico)
- United States v. Chang Da Liu, 538 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2008) (Ninth Circuit reasoning on application of federal sex‑trafficking prohibitions to Pacific commonwealths)