United States v. Maldonado-Burgos
844 F.3d 339
| 1st Cir. | 2016Background
- Defendant Edwin Maldonado-Burgos was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2421(a) for two counts alleging he transported an 18-year-old woman with a severe mental disability within Puerto Rico for unlawful sexual activity.
- The district court dismissed the indictment, holding § 2421(a) does not reach transportation occurring solely within Puerto Rico; government appealed.
- § 2421(a) criminalizes knowingly transporting an individual "in interstate or foreign commerce, or in any Territory or Possession of the United States" for prostitution or other unlawful sexual activity. The statute does not explicitly mention Puerto Rico.
- Pre-1952 precedent (Crespo v. United States) held the Mann Act (predecessor to § 2421) covered transportation wholly within Puerto Rico when Puerto Rico was a territory.
- After Puerto Rico adopted its constitution (1952), this court in Cordova applied a framework asking whether, given Puerto Rico’s changed post‑Constitution status, Congress would have intended a statute to treat Puerto Rico like a state or a territory; Cordova required specific statutory evidence or clear embedded policy reasons to continue treating Puerto Rico as a territory.
- Applying Cordova here, the First Circuit concluded there is no specific textual instruction or post‑1952 legislative history in § 2421(a) indicating Congress intended to treat Puerto Rico as a territory for this statute; accordingly § 2421(a) does not reach transportation occurring solely within Puerto Rico and the district court’s dismissal was affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Maldonado) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 2421(a) covers transportation wholly within Puerto Rico | Crespo controls; Mann Act language and committee reports show Congress intended coverage of territories, so intra‑Puerto Rico transport is covered | Cordova governs post‑1952: Puerto Rico should be treated like a state for statutes that lack specific territorial intent, so § 2421(a) does not reach wholly intra‑Puerto Rico transport | § 2421(a) does not reach transportation occurring solely within Puerto Rico; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether pre‑1952 precedent (Crespo) is binding despite Puerto Rico’s constitutional changes | Crespo and related precedent remain controlling under law‑of‑the‑circuit and savings‑clause arguments | Cordova permits reexamination in light of post‑1952 constitutional developments; Crespo no longer dispositive | Crespo is not dispositive post‑Constitution; Cordova framework controls |
| Whether Cordova’s state/territory test applies to § 2421(a) | Inapplicable because Mann Act’s purposes differ from Sherman Act; committee reports show broad territorial reach | Applicable: ask whether framers, knowing Puerto Rico’s current status, would treat it as state or territory; require embedded statutory evidence to treat it as territory | Cordova framework governs the inquiry for § 2421(a) |
| Whether post‑1952 legislative changes or policy evidence show Congress intended Puerto Rico to remain a territory under § 2421(a) | Post‑1952 amendments and committee reports reflect continued intent to include territories; policy concerns about trafficking support federal reach | Post‑1952 amendments do not specifically identify Puerto Rico; no textual definition or embedded policy in § 2421(a) showing intent to intervene in local affairs of Puerto Rico more than states | No specific textual/post‑1952 evidence or embedded statutory policy found; policy materials unrelated to congressional intent do not satisfy Cordova |
Key Cases Cited
- Crespo v. United States, 151 F.2d 44 (1st Cir. 1945) (pre‑1952 First Circuit holding Mann Act reached transportation wholly within Puerto Rico)
- Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 649 F.2d 36 (1st Cir. 1981) (establishes framework asking whether a statute should treat post‑Constitution Puerto Rico as a state or territory; requires specific statutory evidence to continue territorial treatment)
- Puerto Rico v. Sánchez Valle, 136 S. Ct. 1863 (2016) (Supreme Court discussion of Puerto Rico’s distinctive post‑1952 Commonwealth status)
- Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253 (1937) (pre‑1952 Supreme Court decision treating Puerto Rico as a territory for a federal statute)
- Antilles Cement Corp. v. Fortuño, 670 F.3d 310 (1st Cir. 2012) (examines post‑1952 legislative history to infer congressional intent to include Puerto Rico in a statute that explicitly mentioned it)
- Dávila‑Pérez v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 202 F.3d 464 (1st Cir. 2000) (considers post‑constitutional amendments and textual definitions in assessing whether a statute covers Puerto Rico)