944 F.3d 761
8th Cir.2019Background:
- Defendant Maksim M. Stefanyuk was convicted by a jury of three counts of receipt/distribution of child pornography (18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A)) and one count of failing to register as a sex offender (18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)); district court sentenced him to 262 months.
- Stefanyuk had a prior 2011 conviction for possession of child pornography.
- In 2017 HSI investigated suspected viewing of child pornography at a house where Stefanyuk lived; Special Agent Aramayo conducted physical surveillance and requested electronic video surveillance equipment (EVSE).
- A hidden pole camera in a public right-of-way recorded exterior views (pan/tilt/zoom) of the house for two weeks; recordings were later lost; Aramayo testified she observed Stefanyuk arrive at the residence on two occasions via EVSE.
- Stefanyuk moved to suppress evidence obtained via the EVSE; the district court denied the motion. He also moved to exclude testimony about his prior child-pornography conviction; the district court admitted it. He appealed both rulings.
- The Eighth Circuit affirmed: any EVSE-related Fourth Amendment error was harmless because the EVSE testimony was limited and independent evidence firmly tied Stefanyuk to the residence; admission of prior-conviction testimony was proper under Rules 414 and 404(b).
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Warrantless long-term EVSE surveillance of home | EVSE was continuous, warrantless surveillance of the home and violated the Fourth Amendment; suppress EVSE-derived evidence | Surveillance lawful or any error harmless; supervised-release reduced privacy expectations | Affirmed: court assumed without deciding warrant requirement but held any error harmless because EVSE evidence was minimal and other admissible evidence established residency |
| Admission of testimony about prior child-porn conviction (Rule 414/404(b)) | Prior-conviction testimony was prejudicial and inadmissible | Admissible under Rule 414 as same category of child-molestation conduct and under Rule 404(b) to show motive, knowledge, opportunity, and absence of mistake | Affirmed: district court did not abuse discretion; evidence was essentially the same criminal conduct and relevant under 414 and 404(b) |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Wells, 347 F.3d 280 (8th Cir. 2003) (appellate standard for reviewing denial of a suppression motion)
- United States v. Davis, 569 F.3d 813 (8th Cir. 2009) (standards for reviewing factual findings and legal conclusions on suppression)
- United States v. Davis, 449 F.3d 842 (8th Cir. 2006) (harmless-error standard for erroneous admission of evidence)
- United States v. Martinez, 462 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2006) (applying harmless-error analysis where improper statements should have been suppressed)
- United States v. Summage, 575 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2009) (Rule 414 admissibility when prior conduct is strikingly similar)
- United States v. Holy Bull, 613 F.3d 871 (8th Cir. 2010) (evidentiary rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- United States v. Butler, 56 F.3d 941 (8th Cir. 1995) (Rule 404(b) is a rule of inclusion and district courts have broad discretion to admit such evidence)