678 F.Supp.3d 42
D.D.C.2023Background
- Aug. 2020: Madzarac was arrested and charged with interstate threats and threats against foreign officials related to alleged threats to Libyan embassy staff (18 U.S.C. §§ 875(c), 878(a)).
- Sept. 1, 2020: Defense raised venue objections at the preliminary hearing; the government initially insisted venue in D.C. was proper. Indictment returned in D.C. on Sept. 17, 2020.
- Aug.–Sept. 2022: Defense again pressed venue; the government offered a deferred prosecution agreement that would have required Madzarac to waive venue; he declined the deal.
- Feb–Mar. 2023: Madzarac moved to dismiss for lack of venue; the government conceded D.C. was the wrong venue and moved to dismiss without prejudice (preserving ability to refile elsewhere).
- Defendant opposed a without-prejudice dismissal and sought dismissal with prejudice to bar refiling; Court concluded that, although the government acted in good faith, permitting dismissal without prejudice would amount to objective harassment.
- May 2023: Court dismissed the indictment with prejudice under Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a) and ordered the opinion unsealed (while referenced sealed materials remain sealed).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the government meet its initial burden to show dismissal without prejudice is in the public interest? | U.S.: Dismissal without prejudice is permissible because prosecution could proceed in a proper venue and the conduct is serious. | Madzarac: Not directly disputed at threshold; focus is on subsequent harassment risk. | Held: Government met the low initial public‑interest threshold. |
| Would dismissal without prejudice constitute prosecutorial harassment warranting dismissal with prejudice (bar refiling)? | U.S.: Should be allowed to refile in a district where venue lies; waiver negotiations justified its posture. | Madzarac: Government repeatedly knew venue was improper, pursued indictment, and seeks tactical escape—objective harassment. | Held: Dismissed with prejudice—objective harassment shown because government pursued the case despite repeated notice of improper venue and then sought to avoid its disadvantage. |
| Was the government's conduct in bad faith? | U.S.: Actions were in good faith, responsive to developments, and included a favorable DPA offer. | Madzarac: Conduct had improper purpose and effect even if not malicious. | Held: No bad faith found; dismissal with prejudice was ordered despite government acting in good faith because purpose and effect satisfied harassment test. |
| Should the opinion be public despite sealed materials? | Court: Public right of access outweighed sealing; opinion should be unsealed though referenced documents stay sealed. | — | Held: Opinion unsealed; cited sealed documents remain under seal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22 (U.S. 1977) (leave of court protects defendant from prosecutorial harassment)
- United States v. Poindexter, 719 F. Supp. 6 (D.D.C. 1989) (Rule 48(a) harassment test and court authority to deny leave)
- United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (courts may not deny leave merely for disagreeing with prosecutor’s charging decisions)
- United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (judicial role in guarding against abuse of prosecutorial discretion)
- United States v. Fields, 475 F. Supp. 903 (D.D.C. 1979) (dismissal with prejudice where indictment was baseless and intended to coerce cooperation)
- United States v. Pitts, 331 F.R.D. 199 (D.D.C. 2019) (dismissal with prejudice where dismissal was tactical and left defendant subject to repeated arrests/prosecution)
- United States v. Florian, 765 F. Supp. 2d 32 (D.D.C. 2011) (initial burden on prosecutor to show dismissal without prejudice serves public interest)