United States v. Madkins
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 14550
| 10th Cir. | 2017Background
- Martye Madkins was indicted for distribution of cocaine base and distribution within 1,000 feet of a school; arrested after a multi-defendant, multi-technique drug investigation.
- Trial began June 3, 2015; Madkins moved pretrial to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act based on a January 6–7, 2014 continuance.
- The district court denied the Speedy Trial Act motion, holding the January continuance was an ends-of-justice tolling order; Madkins was convicted on all counts.
- At sentencing the PSR treated Madkins as a career offender based on two Kansas prior convictions (possession with intent to sell cocaine and marijuana), raising his guideline range dramatically.
- The district court applied the career-offender enhancement and declined Madkins’s request for a downward variance, stating it would honor the Guidelines absent "extraordinary circumstances."
- Tenth Circuit: affirms convictions (Speedy Trial claim rejected), vacates sentence and remands for resentencing because (1) Kansas prior convictions do not categorically qualify as federal "controlled substance offenses" for career-offender purposes and (2) the court relied on an impermissible "extraordinary circumstances" rule when denying a variance.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether January 2014 continuance tolled the Speedy Trial Act | Madkins: continuance lacked sufficient ends-of-justice findings and was effectively based on court congestion, so the 70-day clock was not tolled | Government/district court: case was complex, discovery voluminous, multiple defendants and counsel scheduling issues; court made adequate oral and written findings | Court: Affirmed — record (motions, hearing transcript, written order) contained sufficient ends-of-justice findings; continuance not improperly based solely on congestion |
| Whether two Kansas convictions qualify as "controlled substance offenses" for career-offender enhancement | Madkins: Kansas statutes criminalize an "offer to sell," broader than "distribute"/attempt, so priors don't categorically match USSG §4B1.2(b) | Government: priors involved sale/conduct that could be charged as distribution; thus they qualify | Court: Reversed district court — Kansas "sale" (as interpreted by state law/instructions/cases) includes offers to sell, which can be broader than attempt/distribution; priors do not categorically match the Guidelines definition; career-offender enhancement improperly applied |
| Whether district court procedurally erred by denying variance for lack of "extraordinary circumstances" | Madkins: court treated Guidelines as mandatory by requiring "extraordinary circumstances" to vary downward | Government: court within discretion to give weight to Guidelines and prior convictions | Court: Vacated sentence on other grounds but instructs that district court may not treat Guidelines as mandatory or require "extraordinary circumstances" to impose non-Guidelines sentence; remand for resentencing |
Key Cases Cited
- Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006) (Speedy Trial Act requires express on-the-record findings for ends-of-justice continuances)
- United States v. Watson, 766 F.3d 1219 (10th Cir. 2014) (standard of review for ends-of-justice continuances)
- United States v. Occhipinti, 998 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1993) (sufficient record findings can support continuance when supported by motion/record)
- United States v. Toombs, 574 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2009) (short, conclusory statements insufficient for tolling)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (categorical/modified categorical approach for comparing elements)
- Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013) (limitations on conduct-based inquiry; focus on statutory elements)
- Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (rejects requirement of "extraordinary circumstances" to justify variance from Guidelines)
- United States v. Hinkle, 832 F.3d 569 (5th Cir. 2016) (state statute defining delivery to include an offer to sell can make prior conviction broader than Guidelines "controlled substance offense")
- United States v. Savage, 542 F.3d 959 (2d Cir. 2008) (same principle: state definition of sale including offer to sell can prevent classification as controlled substance offense)
- United States v. Cherry, 433 F.3d 698 (10th Cir. 2005) (definition of "distribute" and its use in analysis of predicate offenses)
- United States v. Smith, 433 F.3d 714 (10th Cir. 2006) (earlier conduct-based approach rejected by later Supreme Court precedents)