26 F.4th 528
1st Cir.2022Background
- On April 2, 2018, Massachusetts District Court Judge Shelley M. Richmond Joseph presided over the arraignment of an undocumented noncitizen ("A.S.") who had an ICE detainer and warrant of removal. ICE agents were present in the courthouse.
- The indictment alleges Judge Joseph directed an ICE officer to leave the courtroom, turned the recorder off while devising a plan, and arranged (through Deputy Wesley MacGregor) for A.S. to exit via a rear sally-port so ICE could not take custody; A.S. was later apprehended two weeks later.
- The U.S. Attorney charged Joseph and MacGregor with conspiracy and obstruction offenses under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(c)(2), 1505, and related aiding statutes; MacGregor also faced a perjury count (not challenged here).
- Both defendants moved to dismiss, asserting (inter alia) absolute judicial immunity (Joseph), Tenth Amendment/anti-commandeering protections, federalism and due‑process limits on the obstruction statutes, and that the indictment failed to state offenses.
- The district court denied the motions to dismiss; the defendants appealed pretrial. The First Circuit dismissed the appeals for lack of jurisdiction under the collateral‑order/final‑judgment rule.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Judge Joseph can obtain interlocutory review based on claimed absolute judicial immunity | United States: interlocutory review is improper; immunity claim is not an explicit statutory/constitutional right barring trial | Joseph: absolute judicial immunity (common law) bars prosecution and warrants immediate appeal | Denied: judicial immunity rooted in common law is not an explicit statutory or constitutional "right not to be tried" for collateral‑order purposes; no interlocutory jurisdiction |
| Whether Tenth Amendment/anti‑commandeering doctrine bars prosecution or permits interlocutory appeal | United States: Tenth Amendment defense does not create an unreviewable pretrial right; factual merits belong at trial | Defendants: prosecution impermissibly commandeers state actors and thus cannot proceed; claim is appealable now | Denied: Tenth Amendment text does not guarantee a right not to be tried; defense can be raised at trial and reviewed on final appeal |
| Whether broad federalism/due‑process concerns from prosecutorial interpretation of obstruction statutes justify pretrial review | United States: constitutional objections can be vindicated on final appeal; collateral‑order exception is narrow | Defendants: indictment raises constitutional interests that would be irreparably lost if not reviewed now | Denied: claimed constitutional interests do not satisfy the strict collateral‑order test; due‑process/federalism claims can be addressed after final judgment |
| Whether the indictment’s alleged failure to state an offense is immediately appealable | United States: failure‑to‑state claims are not collateral and are reviewable after final judgment | Defendants: dismissal required now because indictment does not allege federal offenses | Denied: refusal to dismiss for failure to state an offense is not a collateral order and is reviewable on direct appeal following final judgment |
Key Cases Cited
- Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794 (1989) (sets narrow collateral‑order test in criminal cases and requires an explicit statutory/constitutional "right not to be tried")
- Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977) (finality rule in criminal cases; double‑jeopardy denials are collateral orders)
- DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962) (appellate review ordinarily awaits final judgment)
- Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (formulation of the collateral‑order doctrine)
- Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979) (Speech or Debate Clause denials are appealable collateral orders)
- Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166 (2003) (involuntary medication order appealable; did not displace Midland Asphalt rule)
- Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985) (civil absolute‑immunity denials appealable, but is a civil‑law principle not controlling in criminal context)
- Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984) (collateral‑order exception must be strictly construed in criminal cases)
- Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978) (explication of collateral‑order prongs)
- Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993) (Eleventh Amendment immunity denial is an appealable collateral order in civil suits)
- Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Tenth Amendment/anti‑commandeering principle)
- New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (Tenth Amendment/anti‑commandeering principle)
- United States v. Kouri‑Perez, 187 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1999) (due‑process claims can be vindicated on final appeal)