United States v. MacDonald
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 7914
| 4th Cir. | 2011Background
- MacDonald was convicted in 1979 of the Fort Bragg murders of his wife and two daughters; he maintains innocence and has pursued postconviction relief for decades.
- In 2006, this Court authorized a successive §2255 motion for a Britt claim based on newly discovered evidence alleging prosecutorial misconduct and witness pressure.
- Around the same time, DNA testing results were authorized and became available, prompting a second motion seeking a freestanding actual innocence claim and consideration of DNA as part of the Britt claim.
- The district court denied the DNA motion for lack of additional profiling authorization and rejected expanding the record to include post-trial and post-filing evidence.
- The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded, holding that the district court erred in (i) applying the wrong standard for evaluating the “evidence as a whole,” and (ii) denying jurisdiction over the DNA claim and failing to consider post-trial evidence as part of the Britt analysis.
- On remand, the court should apply the §2255(h)(1) standard with a broad “evidence as a whole” review and address whether profiling authorization extends to the DNA claim, potentially via Rule 15(a) amendment or renewed authorization.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court used the correct standard for the Britt claim. | MacDonald argues §2255(h)(1) governs; cites AEDPA’s evidence-as-a-whole test. | The government contends §2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) applies as a state-prisoner analogue to the standard, with narrow evidence scope. | Remanded for proper §2255(h)(1) analysis using the correct standard. |
| Whether the district court properly allowed expansion of the record for the Britt claim. | MacDonald contends post-trial DNA and related evidence should be considered in evaluating the Britt claim. | District court restricted evidence to pre-existing record; expansion was improper. | Remanded to permit full consideration of expanded evidence as part of the Britt claim. |
| Whether the district court had jurisdiction over the freestanding DNA claim after profiling authorization. | MacDonald contends the DNA claim was properly included under the authorized motion. | Without further authorization the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider the DNA claim. | Profiling authorization extends to the DNA claim; remand to evaluate the DNA claim under §2255(h)(1). |
Key Cases Cited
- Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (gateway innocence requires new reliable evidence and all evidence must be considered)
- House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518 (2006) (AEDPA gateway review allows consideration of all evidence, not limited to new evidence)
- McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (abuse of the writ; cause and prejudice or fundamental miscarriage of justice)
- Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992) (miscarriage of justice standard for death-penalty innocence claims)
- Winestock, 340 F.3d 200 (2003) (prefiling authorization governs which claims may be added to §2255 motion)
- In re Williams, 364 F.3d 235 (2004) (framework for evaluating whether claims satisfy AEDPA profiling standards)