United States v. Lynch
726 F.3d 346
| 2d Cir. | 2013Background
- Gregory Lynch, serving a federal sentence, was arrested in New Jersey on an escape warrant and committed for transfer to the District of Connecticut; he arrived at a detention facility used by the Connecticut district before indictment.
- A Connecticut grand jury indicted Lynch for escape on March 13, 2012; he was arraigned in Connecticut on March 23 and pleaded not guilty.
- Defense counsel (Murray) moved to continue a May 8 jury selection date due to scheduling conflicts and outstanding transcript requests; the district court granted the continuance (May 8–June 12) and noted the period would be excluded under the Speedy Trial Act (STA) "subject to" a waiver. Lynch refused to sign a waiver.
- Counsel subsequently withdrew; substitute counsel obtained an additional continuance to July 10. Lynch moved to dismiss the indictment under the STA, arguing (1) pre-arraignment travel delay (13 of 23 days between a New Jersey commitment order and Connecticut arraignment) should count toward the 70-day clock, and (2) the May–June continuance could not be excluded because Lynch did not consent.
- The district court denied the motion, concluding the 70-day STA clock began after Lynch’s first appearance in the charging court (the Connecticut arraignment) and that a court may exclude time for an ends-of-justice continuance granted on counsel’s request without the defendant’s personal consent. Lynch appealed; the Second Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lynch) | Defendant's Argument (Government / Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does the 70‑day STA clock begin under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1)? | Time should include post‑commitment pre‑arraignment delay (travel delay exceeding 10 days) so 13 of 23 days count. | The 70‑day clock begins after the later of indictment filing or defendant’s first appearance in the court where the indictment is pending (here, post‑arraignment). | The clock began after arraignment in Connecticut; pre‑arraignment travel time did not count. |
| Whether § 3161(h)(1)(F)’s 10‑day travel presumption limits exclusion of pre‑arraignment transportation delay | § 3161(h)(1)(F) requires counting unreasonable travel delay exceeding 10 days occurring after the triggering event. | The 10‑day travel presumption applies to transportation delays after the STA clock has begun; it does not bring pre‑arraignment time into the 70‑day computation. | The 10‑day rule does not bring pre‑arraignment transport time into the 70‑day count; the court rejected Lynch’s travel‑time argument. |
| Whether a continuance requested by defense counsel can be excluded under § 3161(h)(7)(A) absent the defendant’s consent | The May 8–June 12 period cannot be excluded because Lynch did not consent to counsel’s continuance request. | A continuance may be requested by counsel and excluded if the court makes on‑record ends‑of‑justice findings; defendant’s personal consent is not required by the STA. | Court may grant ends‑of‑justice continuances on counsel’s request without defendant’s consent, provided statutory findings are on the record. |
| Validity of the district court’s ends‑of‑justice findings when the continuance order referenced a waiver "subject to" exclusion | The order’s reference to a waiver shows the court conditioned exclusion on Lynch’s consent, so findings were inadequate. | The district court made contemporaneous findings that satisfied § 3161(h)(7)(B); the "subject to" waiver language did not negate the court’s independent ends‑of‑justice findings. | The court’s on‑record findings met Zedner’s requirements; exclusion was proper despite Lynch’s refusal to sign a waiver. |
Key Cases Cited
- Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489 (2006) (district court must place ends‑of‑justice findings on the record when granting continuance under STA)
- United States v. Tinklenberg, 131 S. Ct. 2007 (2011) (interpreting § 3161(h)(1)(F) to include weekends/holidays in the 10‑day travel presumption)
- United States v. Pena, 793 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1986) (the day after the triggering event is the first day counted for STA purposes)
- United States v. Thirion, 813 F.2d 146 (8th Cir. 1987) (STA clock does not run until defendant first appears in the court where the indictment is pending)
- United States v. Stewart, 628 F.3d 246 (6th Cir. 2010) (defendant’s written consent is not a statutory requirement for counsel‑requested continuance exclusion)
- United States v. Sobh, 571 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming that continuance requested by counsel may be excluded under § 3161(h)(7)(A))
- United States v. Gates, 709 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2013) (counsel may seek continuance and STA exclusion without first securing defendant’s personal consent)