436 F.Supp.3d 478
D. Conn.2020Background
- Alex Luna pled guilty in 2006 to three counts: count 1 (conspiracy to distribute/possess with intent to distribute 50 grams+ of crack and 5 kg+ of powder cocaine), count 6 (possession with intent to distribute cocaine), and count 12 (firearm possession).
- Luna was sentenced in April 2007 to 360 months on counts 1 and 6 (concurrent) and 120 months on count 12 (concurrent); he has served the sentence on count 12.
- The Fair Sentencing Act (2010) reduced statutory penalties for certain crack-cocaine offenses; the First Step Act (2018) made some of those Fair Sentencing Act provisions retroactive under §404 for "covered offenses."
- The government and Probation argued Luna’s count 1 was not a "covered offense" because it also alleged 5 kg of powder cocaine (unchanged by the Fair Sentencing Act).
- The court concluded count 1 was a covered offense because the statute of conviction included the 50-gram crack quantity; Congress intended eligibility to turn on the statute of conviction (not prosecutorial charging choices or underlying relevant conduct).
- The court granted Luna’s First Step Act motion and ordered a prompt, plenary resentencing on all remaining counts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether count charging both crack and powder is a "covered offense" under the First Step Act | Luna: conviction is covered because count 1 explicitly charged 50 g+ of crack (penalties modified by Fair Sentencing Act) | Gov/Probation: conviction not covered because same count also charged 5 kg powder (penalties not modified) | Count 1 is a covered offense; eligibility depends on statute/conviction language, not prosecutorial charging choices or relevant conduct |
| Whether eligibility under §404 entitles defendant to plenary resentencing on related, non-covered counts | Luna: full resentencing required because Guidelines aggregate counts and total punishment may change; fairness and remedial purpose require plenary resentencing | Gov: relief should be limited to covered offense; §404 motions should be treated as sentence-modification requests under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(B) | Court: §404(b) authorizes plenary resentencing ("impose" language), is distinct from §3582, and plenary resentencing is appropriate given Guidelines grouping and remedial aims |
| Proper interpretive approach (statute of conviction vs. relevant conduct) | Luna: eligibility should be determined from the statute/charge of conviction, not underlying conduct | Gov: eligibility should consider underlying conduct / quantities affecting sentence | Court: statute of conviction controls; relevant-conduct focus would defeat remedial purpose and allow charging choices to determine eligibility |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Gonzalez, 420 F.3d 111 (2d Cir.) (pre-Fair Sentencing Act statutory scheme for crack quantities)
- United States v. Daugerdas, 892 F.3d 545 (2d Cir.) (canon that identical words in a statute should have consistent meaning)
- United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (district court must sentence the defendant considering §3553(a))
- Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239 (1972) (in pari materia canon of statutory construction)
- Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248 (1993) (consistent statutory-meaning canon)
- United States v. Hegwood, 934 F.3d 414 (5th Cir.) (contrasting view on effect of "impose" language)
- United States v. Allen, 384 F. Supp. 3d 238 (D. Conn.) (holding statute-of-conviction governs First Step Act eligibility)
- United States v. Rose, 379 F. Supp. 3d 223 (S.D.N.Y.) (resolving ambiguities in favor of defendants; remedial construction)
- United States v. Dodd, 372 F. Supp. 3d 795 (S.D. Iowa) (First Step Act authorizes reduction independent of §3582 and supports plenary resentencing)