United States v. Lozado, 776 F.3d 1119

Police stopped Gregory Lozado for traffic defects; Lozado fled, was seen holding what appeared to be a handgun, surrendered, and was arrested. Searches of his car and apartment produced ammunition, drugs, and items linking Novelle Farris to some items. Lozado later admitted ownership of some items but denied ownership of drugs/bullets found in Farris’s shorts.
Investigators later interviewed Farris, who (while assured he would not be arrested) said the drugs and ammunition found in the shorts and the bullets in the car belonged to him; Farris admitted drug use but insisted he had done nothing illegal.
Grand jury indicted Lozado for being a felon in possession of ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Lozado sought to admit Farris’s statements under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) (statement against penal interest); the government opposed admission.
District court found Farris unavailable (he invoked the Fifth Amendment) and admitted Farris’s statements about the drugs but excluded his statements about the ammunition, concluding (1) a reasonable person in Farris’s position would not have known possession of ammunition as a drug user was criminal under § 922(g)(3), and (2) corroborating circumstances for the ammunition claim were insufficient.
Jury convicted Lozado of ammunition possession; he was sentenced to 235 months and appealed the exclusion of Farris’s ammunition statement. The Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Lozado's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether Farris’s statement that the ammunition was his qualifies as a statement against penal interest under Rule 804(b)(3)(A)	The statement itself exposed Farris to criminal liability (§ 922(g)(3)); subjective awareness of its incriminating nature is not required — the fact that it tended to incriminate is sufficient.	A statement is against penal interest only if a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would know it was self‑inculpatory; here Farris likely did not know possession by a drug user is a federal crime.	Affirmed exclusion: court may consider declarant’s actual knowledge; on the record a reasonable person in Farris’s position would not have realized the statement was self‑inculpatory, so Rule 804(b)(3)(A) not satisfied.
Whether there were corroborating circumstances clearly indicating trustworthiness under Rule 804(b)(3)(B)	Corroboration of Farris’s statement is unnecessary if the statement itself is against penal interest.	Even if the statement were against penal interest, corroboration is required and is lacking here.	Affirmed exclusion: insufficient corroborating circumstances (no independent evidence tying the car ammunition to Farris; close family relationship and material inconsistencies undermined trustworthiness).

Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994) (explains the rationale for statements against interest and that context matters in determining whether a statement is self‑inculpatory)
United States v. Porter, 881 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1989) (sets out prerequisites for admitting statements against penal interest)
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996) (abuse of discretion standard for reviewing trial court rulings)
United States v. Salvador, 820 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1987) (corroborating circumstances must clearly indicate trustworthiness for admission under Rule 804(b)(3)(B))