United States v. Lowell, 2f4th1291

Lowell and his girlfriend stole a truck, were stopped at a Border Patrol checkpoint, and fled in a high‑speed chase; they then carjacked a Toyota 4Runner at gunpoint.
They eluded law enforcement for about 2½ hours, during which they used meth, stole spark plugs at Walmart to facilitate further thefts, and scoped out other vehicles. Police actively searched for them using multiple agencies and a helicopter.
A second pursuit began; while driving erratically and at high speed the 4Runner struck and killed a motorcyclist. Lowell and his girlfriend fled, were arrested, and Lowell pleaded guilty to multiple counts including carjacking resulting in death (18 U.S.C. § 2119(3)).
The PSR applied the robbery guideline (USSG § 2B3.1) with a cross‑reference to first‑degree murder (USSG § 2A1.1) under § 2B3.1(c), treating the death as felony murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111; that produced a very high offense level, later adjusted downward by the court.
Lowell objected that (a) his guilty plea was invalid because he lacked specific intent to kill during the carjacking and (b) the § 2B3.1(c) cross‑reference was inapplicable because carjacking is not covered by § 1111 and the death did not occur "in the perpetration of" the carjacking.
The district court overruled his objections, applied the cross‑reference (with a limited departure), sentenced Lowell to 365 months plus an 84‑month consecutive § 924(c) term (total 449 months), and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.

Issue	Lowell's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Validity of guilty plea / § 2119(3) "if death results" element	The prefatory specific‑intent language requires intent to cause death during the carjacking; because he did not intend that, § 2119(3) does not apply	§ 2119(3)’s "death results" means but‑for causation; specific intent in the prefatory paragraph applies to the taking, not to causation of any subsequent death	Affirmed: "death results" requires but‑for causation, not specific intent to cause the death during the taking; factual basis supported plea
Applicability of USSG § 2B3.1(c) cross‑reference to § 2A1.1	Carjacking is a distinct offense (not literally listed in § 1111) so it cannot be an underlying felony for felony murder	Carjacking is a species of robbery and thus falls within the categories enumerated in § 1111; cross‑reference may apply	Affirmed: carjacking is encompassed by "robbery" for § 1111 purposes; cross‑reference may apply
Whether motorcyclist's death was "in the perpetration of" the carjacking (felony‑murder scope)	The carjacking had been completed hours earlier and Lowell reached temporary safety; the death resulted from flight, not the carjacking	Flight was continuous and active pursuit was ongoing; defendant never reached a point of temporary safety; intervening acts did not break the causal chain	Affirmed: no temporary safety point; death occurred in perpetration of the carjacking, so felony murder rule applies

Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) ("results from" language ordinarily requires but‑for causation)
United States v. Burkholder, 816 F.3d 607 (10th Cir. 2016) (interpreting "death results" language to require but‑for causation)
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999) (recognizing carjacking as a type of robbery)
Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1 (1999) (noting carjacking provides a federal penalty for a particular type of robbery)
United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1999) (categorical inclusion of related offenses within § 1111 categories)
United States v. Rodriguez-Adorno, 695 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2012) (applying first‑degree murder cross‑reference to carjacking)
United States v. Hicks, 103 F.3d 837 (9th Cir. 1996) (same)
United States v. Patton, 927 F.3d 1087 (10th Cir. 2019) (point of temporary safety is relevant to robbery analysis)
United States v. Martinez-Bermudez, 387 F.3d 98 (1st Cir. 2004) (if defendant completely evades capture and retains vehicle, a later accident may be outside scope of carjacking)