United States v. Louis Carbins, Jr.
882 F.3d 557
| 5th Cir. | 2018Background
- Defendant Louis W. Carbins was convicted after a jury trial of conspiracy to defraud the United States, seven counts of aiding and abetting theft of government money (18 U.S.C. § 641), and one count of aiding and abetting aggravated identity theft (18 U.S.C. § 1028A); this appeal challenges only the § 1028A conviction.
- Co-defendant Laphrida Watts pleaded guilty to conspiracy and aggravated identity theft and testified for the government, describing an online scheme run by an individual called “Doc” involving "bank drops": electronic deposits into third‑party accounts and subsequent wire transfers (often via MoneyGram) to names/addresses provided by Doc.
- Carbins opened multiple bank accounts, provided account access to Doc, and received large electronic deposits labeled on bank statements as “US Treasury,” “Tax Ref,” or “IRS,” with payee names that did not match Carbins. Substantial withdrawals and purchases immediately followed many deposits.
- The IRS records showed numerous fraudulent e‑filed tax returns using real taxpayers’ names/SSNs that directed refunds into Carbins’ accounts; total refunds deposited into his accounts exceeded the amounts requested on the fraudulent returns.
- Banks froze accounts and returned funds after discovering mismatched payee names; testimony showed Carbins met with bank personnel and was told deposits were IRS refunds that did not belong to him; evidence supported that Carbins had online access to account entries and received advance emails from Doc about incoming drops.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Government) | Defendant's Argument (Carbins) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for aiding and abetting aggravated identity theft (§ 1028A via § 2) | Evidence (bank descriptions, timing of withdrawals, Watts' testimony, IRS filings) shows Carbins knowingly used others' names/SSNs without authority during theft of gov't money; deliberate ignorance suffices for knowledge. | Carbins lacked knowledge that deposits were IRS refunds obtained by misuse of others' identities; any awareness came too late to be aiding/abetting under Rosemond. | Affirmed. A rational jury could find Carbins knowingly used others' means of identification (or was deliberately ignorant) during the § 641 thefts; his advance knowledge before some April 2013 filings satisfied Rosemond timing. |
| Whether bank statement descriptions and conduct support knowledge of IRS source | Bank deposit labels ("US Treasury," "Tax Ref," "IRS") and contemporaneous withdrawals permit inference that Carbins accessed accounts online and thus knew (or deliberately avoided knowing) funds were IRS tax refunds. | Such labels are ambiguous and do not prove Carbins knew deposits resulted from misuse of victims' identities; discovery of IRS source (per banks) occurred later. | Labels plus Watkins' testimony and pattern of behavior supported reasonable inference of knowledge/deliberate ignorance before certain filings; not too ambiguous to preclude conviction. |
| Application of Rosemond (advance knowledge requirement for aiding/abetting compound crimes) | For a combination crime like § 1028A (linked to § 641), Carbins had advance knowledge before one charged instance (April filings) and thus could have opted to walk away. | Even if Carbins later learned, that knowledge came after key acts — too late under Rosemond to support accomplice intent. | Rosemond does not bar conviction here because jury could infer Carbins had requisite advance knowledge (or deliberate avoidance) before the relevant filing once label/info was available. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Mahmood, 820 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2016) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence; de novo but highly deferential)
- United States v. Chapman, 851 F.3d 363 (5th Cir. 2017) (same; appellate deference to jury verdict)
- Flores‑Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009) (knowledge that identification belongs to another is required under § 1028A)
- Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014) (aiding and abetting a combination crime requires intent covering the full, compound offense; advance knowledge may be required)
- United States v. Churchwell, 807 F.3d 107 (5th Cir. 2015) (deliberate ignorance satisfies knowledge element when defendant was subjectively aware of high probability of illegal conduct and avoided learning more)
- United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509 (5th Cir. 2006) (procedural rule limiting sufficiency review when district court reserved ruling on Rule 29 motion)