United States v. Lorenzo Mosley
759 F.3d 664
7th Cir.2014Background
- Mosley was on supervised release after a 2008 conviction for distributing crack; state police arrested him after observing a traffic stop and alleged drug transaction.
- Officers found a small amount of crack and marijuana in Mosley’s car, $300–$400 in cash, and no drug paraphernalia in the vehicle.
- The passenger, Sheryl Simmons, was contacted shortly after; she surrendered four small yellow baggies of what appeared to be crack and a crack pipe.
- Simmons gave out-of-court statements (on video and to the arresting officer) that she had bought five little yellow baggies from Mosley during the stop and had bought from him many times before.
- At the revocation hearing Mosley admitted simple possession and the suspended-license violation but objected to admission of Simmons’s hearsay and to being denied confrontation; the district court admitted the hearsay, found a Grade A distribution violation, and sentenced Mosley to 21 months.
- The Seventh Circuit found the district court erred under Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C) by failing to balance Mosley’s confrontation interest against the government’s reasons for not producing Simmons, but deemed the error harmless because non‑hearsay circumstantial evidence alone would have supported revocation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether admission of Simmons’s out-of-court statements without a district-court balancing under Rule 32.1 violated Mosley’s rights | Mosley: admission of testimonial hearsay without opportunity to confront violated Rule 32.1 and due process | Government: hearsay was reliable and admissible under Morrissey balancing; Confrontation Clause not applicable to revocation | Court: Rule 32.1 balancing was required and not done—error occurred, but error was harmless on the record |
| Whether Due Process/Crawford/Crawford-type confrontation protections barred admission of the statements | Mosley: Fifth Amendment due process required live confrontation absent good cause | Government: Sixth Amendment/Crawford not applicable in revocation; reliability equates to good cause under circuit precedent | Court: Sixth Amendment inapplicable; under Morrissey and circuit precedent reliability can suffice for due process — here statements were sufficiently trustworthy |
| Whether the hearsay was sufficiently reliable to satisfy Morrissey’s good-cause standard | Mosley: reliability contested because he could not cross-examine Simmons | Government: statements were corroborated by officer observations, physical evidence, and Mosley’s prior conviction pattern | Court: Statements bore substantial guarantees of trustworthiness (corroboration, statement against penal interest), so reliability satisfied due-process standard |
| Whether the error was harmless (i.e., would result be same without the hearsay) | Mosley: admission affected sentencing by elevating violation grade | Government: ample circumstantial non‑hearsay evidence supported distribution finding | Court: Harmless — non‑hearsay facts (officer observations, seized baggies, cash, lack of paraphernalia, prior conviction using identical yellow baggies) suffice to prove distribution by preponderance |
Key Cases Cited
- Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (due process requires revocation hearing and right to confront adverse witnesses unless good cause shown)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (Sixth Amendment bars admission of testimonial hearsay unless declarant unavailable and defendant had prior opportunity to cross-examine)
- United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2006) (Sixth Amendment not applicable to supervised-release revocations; reliability can satisfy Morrissey)
- United States v. Jordan, 742 F.3d 276 (7th Cir. 2014) (Rule 32.1 requires explicit balancing of confrontation interest against government reasons for not producing witness)
- United States v. Goad, 44 F.3d 580 (7th Cir. 1995) (standard for revocation is proof by a preponderance of the evidence)
- United States v. Pratt, 52 F.3d 671 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing reliability as substitute for specific good-cause finding)
- Egerstaffer v. Israel, 726 F.2d 1231 (7th Cir. 1984) (hearsay reliability and trustworthiness considerations)
- United States v. Johnson, 927 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1991) (admission of hearsay may be harmless where strong circumstantial evidence independently establishes facts)