United States v. Longwell, 410 F. App'x 684

Jennifer M. Longwell was convicted by a jury of one count of concealment of assets and two counts of making false statements in bankruptcy.
The district court sentenced Longwell to 41 months imprisonment.
Trial was temporarily continued due to defense counsel’s family emergency; eleven jurors were seated by stipulation and the trial resumed.
During a continuance, prosecutors sought Longwell’s 2002–2005 tax returns; defense counsel sought withdrawal from the eleven-juror stipulation.
At sentencing, the court calculated loss at $180,000 and applied a two-level enhancement for ten or more victims and for use of a special skill.
Longwell challenged loss calculation, number of victims, and application of § 3B1.3; the district court denied these objections and the sentence was affirmed on appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the mistrial denial was an abuse of discretion	Longwell claims continued trial without consent and harmed defense; argues improper jury instruction and handling of Rule 23(b).	Government contends discretion to continue and manage proceedings lies with counsel and court; stipulation to eleven jurors was proper.	No reversible error; district court did not abuse discretion in denying mistrial.
Whether loss was properly calculated	Loss should exclude interest and penalties; bankruptcy discharge figures should not inflate loss.	Loss includes amounts Longwell sought to discharge in bankruptcy; interest/penalties may be included when intended to be discharged.	Loss properly included the bankruptcy figure; calculation not error.
Whether number of victims was correctly determined	District court erred by treating ten or more victims as satisfied without sufficient evidence.	Creditor losses were supported by the record; forty-four creditors suffered actual loss.	Ten or more victims established; two-level increase upheld.
Whether § 3B1.3 special skill adjustment was proper	Mortgage broker is not a qualifying 'special skill' under § 3B1.3 and did not facilitate the offense.	Mortgage broker possesses a unique, license-based skill not common to the public and used to facilitate the offense.	Special skill adjustment applied; mortgage broker qualifies and was used to facilitate the offense.

United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281 (4th Cir. 1989) (discretion in mistrial rulings; abuse standard)
United States v. Smith, 44 F.3d 1259 (4th Cir. 1995) (mistrial denials and continuances; prophylactic protections)
United States v. Araujo, 62 F.3d 930 (7th Cir. 1995) (Rule 23(b) stipulations and voluntariness considerations)
United States v. Patterson, 26 F.3d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (Rule 23(b) stipulations; absence of juror suitability)
United States v. Essex, 734 F.2d 832 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (absence of juror and continuance practices)
United States v. Curbelo, 343 F.3d 273 (4th Cir. 2003) (Curbelo grounds for reversal when court proceeding with jurors violates Rule 23(b))
United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2005) (loss in bankruptcy fraud cases; intended loss standard)
United States v. Gormley, 201 F.3d 290 (4th Cir. 2000) (whether mortgage broker constitutes a special skill under § 3B1.3)