United States v. Lon Campbell, 813 F.3d 1016

Campbell bought and used another person's Social Security number to obtain a driver's license, open credit lines, and buy a vehicle; he pled guilty to one count under 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B).
In a written plea agreement Campbell knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, including challenges to how the sentence or offense level were calculated.
At sentencing the district court imposed 21 months imprisonment (within the Guidelines), consecutive to a prior sentence, about $15,000 restitution, and three years of supervised release with standard and special conditions drawn from the PSR.
Campbell immediately filed a notice of appeal challenging several supervised-release conditions as unconstitutionally vague: district travel restriction, family-support and employment requirements, limits on “excessive” alcohol use, prohibition on associating with felons, third-party notice of risk, and probation home visits.
Campbell raised only one objection at sentencing (the meaning of “regular” employment), which the judge clarified; Campbell did not object to other conditions in the PSR and had received the PSR in advance.
The Seventh Circuit concluded Campbell’s broad, unambiguous appellate waiver foreclosed his challenge and dismissed the appeal, noting limited, narrowly defined exceptions to enforcing waivers did not apply.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Campbell)	Defendant's Argument (Government)	Held
Whether supervised-release conditions are unconstitutionally vague	Conditions (travel, family support, employment, alcohol, associating with felons, third-party notice, visits) are vague and need remand for resentencing	The plea waiver bars appellate review of sentence and conditions; any ambiguity could be addressed at sentencing or via §3583 modification	Waiver enforced; appeal dismissed
Whether the appellate waiver is enforceable against constitutional or plain errors	Waiver should be excused because conditions are vague and could chill rights or be fundamentally unfair	Waiver is knowing, voluntary, clear, and covers challenges to sentence and conditions; only narrow exceptions apply	Waiver valid; no exception applies
Whether Adkins exception (vagueness chilling First Amendment) applies	Relies on Adkins to argue appellate review should be allowed for vague conditions analogous to Adkins	Adkins concerned restrictions on protected speech and lack of procedural opportunity to clarify; facts here differ (no speech issue, opportunities to clarify existed)	Adkins inapplicable
Whether procedural fairness or unorthodox practices justify ignoring the waiver	Argues conditions are unfairly vague and thus fundamental fairness requires review	No evidence of fundamentally unfair procedure or extraordinary dysfunction at sentencing; defendant had PSR and could object	No procedural-basis exception; waiver stands

United States v. Smith, 759 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2014) (enforceability of appellate waivers and limits on appellate review)
United States v. Quintero, 618 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 2010) (standards for enforcing plea-agreement appeal waivers)
United States v. Adkins, 743 F.3d 176 (7th Cir. 2014) (vacating vague supervised-release condition that chilled protected speech)
United States v. Bownes, 405 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2005) (limited exceptions to appeal waivers, e.g., race, statutory maximum, fundamental unfairness, ineffective assistance)
United States v. Kappes, 782 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2015) (best practices re: advance notice of potential supervised-release conditions)
United States v. Douglas, 806 F.3d 979 (7th Cir. 2015) (defendant must raise ambiguities at sentencing to preserve claim)