United States v. Liriano
2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 14948
| 1st Cir. | 2014Background
- Border Patrol agents stopped an erratically driven Ford Focus near the Akwesasne Reservation and found two duffel bags of marijuana and a smaller bag with ~40,000 BZP pills; driver Xavier Robert was arrested and cooperated in a controlled-delivery operation.
- Robert, directed by agents, called a Rhode Island number and used the word “candy” as a prearranged euphemism; Dennis Liriano answered and arranged a meeting in Providence.
- At the meeting Liriano expressed concern about surveillance and suggested going to his house; both men were arrested.
- Robert refused to testify at Liriano’s first trial (resulting in a hung jury); he did not testify at the second trial where Liriano was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance.
- Liriano moved for acquittal and a new trial arguing insufficiency of evidence, Confrontation Clause violations from admission of recorded statements, prosecutorial misconduct in closing (improperly asserting "candy" was a code word and invoking agent experience), and relevancy of a Montreal business card; the district court denied relief and the First Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Liriano's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of the evidence for conspiracy | Evidence only shows a meeting and possible familiarity with local sites, not agreement to receive a controlled substance or knowledge that "candy" = drugs | Calls, contacts with Canadian handlers, Liriano’s replies and conduct (arrival, worry about surveillance), and his reaction to "candy" permit reasonable inference of agreement and knowledge | Affirmed — evidence sufficient for a rational jury to find conspiracy and knowledge of a controlled substance |
| Confrontation Clause (admission of recorded statements by non-testifying Robert and Agent Charles) | Admission prevented cross-examination of declarants about meaning of “candy” and agent prompting | Robert’s question to Liriano was admitted for context (not for its truth); any error from admitting Charles’s prompting was waived or harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given the overall evidence and defense use of the tape | Affirmed — no Confrontation Clause reversal; context exception and harmlessness apply |
| Prosecutorial misconduct in rebuttal (arguing "candy" was a code word and invoking "veteran agents") | Prosecutor introduced facts not in evidence and relied on knowledge unavailable to the jury, infecting a close case and warranting a new trial | Closing argument invited permissible inferences from the record; prosecutor did not assert extrinsic facts as proved evidence; remarks were isolated and jury instructed that argument is not evidence | Affirmed — remarks were permissible inference, isolated, and not prejudicial enough to require new trial (dissent would reverse) |
| Admission of Montreal business card | Card was irrelevant and should have been excluded | Card was probative because other conspirators were Canadian and wallet also linked to Akwesasne; relevance need only move inquiry forward | Affirmed — card was relevant and admissible |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. United States, 717 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2013) (standard for reciting facts in sufficiency review)
- Paret-Ruiz v. United States, 567 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2009) (elements of conspiracy and proof of agreement)
- Santiago v. United States, 566 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2009) (informant’s statements admissible as context, not for truth)
- Burgos v. United States, 703 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012) (government need prove defendant knew conspiracy involved a controlled substance but not the exact substance)
- Cianci v. United States, 378 F.3d 71 (1st Cir. 2004) (waiver by failing to propose redactions to tapes)
- Cabrera-Rivera v. United States, 583 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2009) (harmlessness analysis for Confrontation Clause errors)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (testimonial hearsay and confrontation doctrine)
- O’Shea v. United States, 426 F.3d 475 (1st Cir. 2005) (limits on prosecutor relying on evidence not before jury during closing)
