United States v. Lindon Amede
977 F.3d 1086
| 11th Cir. | 2020Background
- DEA reverse-sting: undercover Detective Gandarillas posed as a seller after a confidential source ("Troy") connected him with buyer intermediaries in Trinidad (Chang) and Lindon Amede.
- December 2016–January 2017 negotiations: recorded calls and messages among Chang, Amede, and Gandarillas arranging bulk cocaine purchases (10–20 kg plans), Amede traveled to Fort Lauderdale, sampled cocaine, and negotiated terms.
- January 25, 2017 transaction: Amede arrived in a van with a hidden compartment holding ~$124,900, inspected/sampled five kilograms of cocaine, offered collateral (a watch), and was arrested at a warehouse under surveillance.
- Post-arrest: Amede made unrecorded Miranda-waived statements, participated in controlled calls, and consented to phone searches; his phone records corroborated communications with Chang.
- Defense and trial: Amede asserted duress/coercion by Chang and associates (threats to family in Trinidad); district court largely limited duress evidence but allowed some testimony; jury convicted Amede of attempted possession with intent to distribute ≥5 kg cocaine; sentenced to 121 months (mandatory minimum 120).
- Appeal issues focused on admission of co-conspirator statements, mens rea/jury instruction ("willfully" vs "knowingly"), sufficiency of evidence, duress-defense limitations, and counsel/substitution/self-representation at sentencing; Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Amede) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of pre-intro recorded calls (Dec 17, 21, 22) | Calls predated Amede’s known participation; hearsay not admissible as co-conspirator statements | Statements were during and in furtherance of conspiracy; admissible against later-joining co‑conspirator | Admitted: court did not abuse discretion; Reeves/Hasner allow statements against late joiners |
| Jury instruction/constructive amendment (omission of "willfully") | Omission of "willfully" altered indictment’s mens rea and constructively amended charges | "Willfully" is not an element of §841(a)(1)/§846; indictment language was surplusage | No constructive amendment; "knowingly" is the proper mens rea and removal was permissible |
| Sufficiency of evidence (mens rea: knowingly/willfully) | Even if guilty acts proved, participation was not voluntary/willful because of coercion; insufficient proof of culpable mens rea | Statute and precedent require only knowledge; abundant direct and circumstantial evidence showed knowing intent to distribute | Conviction affirmed: sufficient evidence of knowing intent; "willfulness" irrelevant to statutory elements |
| Duress defense limitations | District court improperly restricted cross-examination and testimony, preventing a full duress defense | Amede failed to proffer evidence satisfying duress element that he had no reasonable opportunity to escape/report; limitations discretionary and harmless | No abuse of discretion: duress legally deficient (failed to show lack of reasonable alternatives); any error harmless because proffered testimony largely elicited |
| Right to counsel at sentencing / discharge of retained counsel & waiver | Court erred denying substitute appointed counsel pre-sentencing and improperly allowed sentencing to proceed after Amede discharged retained counsel without finding valid waiver | Defendant had no right to chosen appointed counsel absent good cause; Amede fired retained counsel and, by conduct and prior colloquies, knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel | No reversible error: denial of substitute appointed counsel not an abuse (no good cause); waiver/self-representation at sentencing was knowing and voluntary under the record |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Harris, 886 F.3d 1120 (11th Cir. 2018) (standard for admissibility of co-conspirator statements)
- United States v. Hasner, 340 F.3d 1261 (11th Cir. 2003) (district court may provisionally admit co-conspirator statements and consider other evidence)
- United States v. Reeves, 742 F.3d 487 (11th Cir. 2014) (co-conspirator statements admissible against a defendant who joins after the statement)
- United States v. Joseph, 709 F.3d 1082 (11th Cir. 2013) (mens rea for §841(a)(1) is knowledge, not willfulness)
- United States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir. 1989) (elements of §841(a)(1) include knowledge and intent to distribute)
- United States v. Cancelliere, 69 F.3d 1116 (11th Cir. 1995) (distinguishing when indictment language is mere surplusage vs. material alteration)
- United States v. Wattleton, 296 F.3d 1184 (11th Cir. 2002) (elements required to establish duress defense)
- United States v. Evans, 358 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2004) (attempt requires proof of mens rea for underlying crime and a substantial step)
- United States v. Garey, 540 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2008) (standards for waiver of counsel and self-representation)
- United States v. Jimenez-Antunez, 820 F.3d 1267 (11th Cir. 2016) (limits on substituting counsel when it would interfere with administration of the courts)