13 F.4th 96
1st Cir.2021Background
- FBI used a Network Investigative Technique (NIT) to identify a computer linked to a child‑pornography site and traced one such computer to Alex Levin.
- A search of Levin’s apartment recovered laptops; forensic analysis found 13 files that Levin conceded were child pornography, 10 of which had filenames containing “pthc” (preteen hardcore).
- Levin’s machine also contained Windows “link” (.lnk) files and registry entries (RecentDocs and WordWheelQuery) showing searches and recently accessed filenames with terms like “pthc” and “pedowoman.”
- Levin was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2); the district court initially suppressed evidence based on a Rule 41 geographic-warrant issue, but this court reversed on good‑faith grounds in a prior appeal.
- At trial the court permitted juror-submitted questions (two were asked of Levin’s forensic expert), and it gave the pattern instruction on the definition of “knowingly” at the defense’s request.
- The jury convicted Levin; he was sentenced to 78 months’ imprisonment and 60 months’ supervised release; Levin appealed on sufficiency, juror questions, and the jury instruction.
Issues
| Issue | Government’s Argument | Levin’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of the evidence to prove Levin knowingly possessed child pornography | Circumstantial evidence (search terms, registry entries, link files, and presence of actual illicit files) permits a rational jury to infer knowledge | Lack of direct proof Levin opened the files; files might have been downloaded or accessed without his knowledge | Affirmed: circumstantial evidence (searches for “pthc,” registry hits, link files, and files elsewhere on drive) was sufficient to support conviction |
| Allowing juror questions | Procedure was proper and consistent with precedent; only two technical questions were asked and answers favored defense | Allowing juror questions unfairly prejudiced Levin | No plain error: no substantial-rights effect; questions were limited, non-prejudicial, and helpful to defense |
| Jury instruction defining “knowingly” | Pattern instruction fairly states the law; defense requested it | Instruction could be misleading | Waived: Levin requested the pattern instruction, so no review for plain error |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316 (1st Cir. 2017) (prior appeal reversing suppression under the good‑faith exception)
- United States v. Cruz‑Ramos, 987 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 2021) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence)
- United States v. Breton, 740 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2014) (filenames and related files can support knowledge of child pornography)
- United States v. Figueroa‑Lugo, 793 F.3d 179 (1st Cir. 2015) (search terms can show knowledge)
- United States v. Pires, 642 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011) (circumstantial evidence of knowledge in child‑pornography cases)
- United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006 (1st Cir. 1993) (standards and limits for juror questions)
- United States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d 1001 (1st Cir. 1992) (permitting limited juror questions in complex trials)
- United States v. Millán‑Machuca, 991 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2021) (plain‑error framework)
- United States v. Delgado‑Marrero, 744 F.3d 167 (1st Cir. 2014) (plain‑error review for unpreserved jury‑instruction objections)
- United States v. Lara, 970 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2020) (waiver where defendant requests the instruction)