United States v. Lett, 944 F.3d 467

Keston Lett, a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, was arrested at JFK after CBP allegedly found ~2.12 kg of cocaine; he was paroled for criminal prosecution, detained by the BOP, and indicted on federal narcotics charges.
A magistrate initially ordered detention under the Bail Reform Act (BRA); at a later hearing the district court ordered Lett released and the government did not appeal that order.
ICE had lodged a detainer; after the BRA release order BOP transferred Lett to DHS/ICE custody, and ICE commenced removal proceedings alleging inadmissibility as a controlled‑substance trafficker.
The district court ordered the government to release Lett if it intended to prosecute; when ICE refused, the court dismissed the indictment with prejudice, concluding BRA release precluded INA detention and the government must choose prosecution or removal.
The government appealed; the Second Circuit vacated the dismissal, holding BRA release does not bar immigration detention under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and remanded with instructions to reinstate the indictment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a district‑court release under the BRA precludes immigration detention under the INA	Lett: BRA release forecloses INA detention; government must choose prosecution or removal	Government: BRA and INA serve distinct purposes; INA independently authorizes detention during removal	Held: No statutory conflict; INA detention may proceed despite BRA release
Effect of 18 U.S.C. § 3142(d) ten‑day provision	Lett: §3142(d) gives ICE an exclusive 10‑day window and reflects priority for prosecution unless ICE acts	Government: §3142(d) is a notice/temporary custody provision, not a limit on later INA detention	Held: §3142(d) limits release timing and provides notice; it does not bar subsequent INA detention
Whether government had to extend parole to permit prosecution	Lett: Government could have and should have extended parole to keep Lett for prosecution	Government: Parole extension is discretionary under the INA; not required	Held: Parole is discretionary; INA nonetheless authorizes detention and government was not obliged to extend parole
Whether ICE regulations prohibit deporting persons charged in criminal cases	Lett: 8 C.F.R. §§215 regs bar deporting aliens who are party to criminal cases	Government: Those regs govern voluntary departure, not forcible removal under INA	Held: Regulations constrain voluntary departure, not INA removal/detention authority

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (purpose of the BRA)
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (statutory harmonization canon)
Lander v. Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 2001) (standard of review: de novo legal questions)
United States v. Soriano Nunez, 928 F.3d 240 (3d Cir. 2019) (BRA and INA are compatible)
United States v. Vasquez‑Benitez, 919 F.3d 546 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (INA detention authority unaffected by BRA release)
United States v. Veloz‑Alonso, 910 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2018) (BRA does not preclude other agencies from lawful custody)
United States v. Ailon‑Ailon, 875 F.3d 1334 (10th Cir. 2017) (distinguishing voluntary departure rules)
In re Nortel Networks Corp. Sec. Litig., 539 F.3d 129 (2d Cir. 2008) (appellate waiver doctrine)