United States v. Leoner-Aguirre
939 F.3d 310
| 1st Cir. | 2019Background:
- Rafael Leoner-Aguirre ("Aguirre"), a high-ranking leader of the MS-13 "Enfermos" clique in Massachusetts, was indicted and convicted (jury trial) of one count of RICO conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d); sentenced to 228 months.
- Government alleged the conspiracy involved a pattern of racketeering acts (murder/attempted murder, armed robberies, narcotics trafficking) and relied in part on evidence of acts committed before and after Aguirre's arrest.
- Trial evidence included eyewitness testimony, recorded statements by co-conspirators, recordings indicating Aguirre ordered a prison-ordered killing, and proof he continued to exercise leadership while imprisoned.
- Aguirre challenged (a) jury instructions on RICO conspiracy elements (relied on Ramírez-Rivera), (b) absence of an affirmative jury finding identifying which predicate acts were proved, (c) the district court's withdrawal instruction and the allocation of the burden of proof, and (d) several evidentiary rulings (Napue, co-conspirator hearsay, Rule 403) and a double jeopardy claim.
- The First Circuit affirmed: it followed Salinas and related precedent, rejected Aguirre’s requested Ramírez-Rivera formulation, upheld the withdrawal instruction and allocation of burden, and found no reversible evidentiary or double jeopardy error.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether jury must be instructed per Ramírez‑Rivera (that defendant must have "participated in the conduct ... through a pattern ... by agreeing to commit, or in fact committing, two or more predicate offenses"). | Government: Salinas controls; prosecution need not prove defendant personally committed/agreed to commit the predicate acts—only that he knew of and agreed to facilitate a pattern. | Aguirre: District court was obliged to follow Ramírez‑Rivera and require jury finding that he committed/agree to commit the two predicate acts. | Court: Rejected Ramírez‑Rivera language as inconsistent with Salinas; Salinas controls—no personal-commission/agreement requirement. |
| Whether jury must explicitly identify which predicate acts (or specific acts by defendant/co‑conspirators) were proved beyond reasonable doubt. | Government: Not required; unanimity as to types of racketeering activity suffices under Salinas. | Aguirre: Needed specification to adjudicate his "lesser included" offense defense and to know which acts formed the pattern. | Court: No error; Salinas does not require an identification of specific predicate acts; types/unanimity on types is sufficient. |
| Withdrawal defense—burden of proof and sufficiency where defendant was arrested and imprisoned. | Government: Defendant bears burden to prove affirmative withdrawal; imprisonment alone does not constitute withdrawal; evidence showed Aguirre remained active/leader in prison. | Aguirre: He withdrew upon arrest/incarceration; placing burden on him is unconstitutional. | Court: Affirmed; imprisonment not automatic withdrawal; Smith controls—allocating burden to defendant is constitutional; evidence supported no withdrawal. |
| Evidentiary and other trial rulings (alleged false testimony/Napue, admission of Menjivar recording under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)/Petrozziello, Rule 403, double jeopardy). | Government: Agent testimony was not false or was stricken; co‑conspirator statements admissible; post‑arrest evidence and meetings were probative to rebut defense characterization; double jeopardy claim defeated by Gamble. | Aguirre: Prosecutors relied on misleading/false testimony; recording was hearsay/opinion; post‑arrest evidence was unfairly prejudicial; state prosecution triggered double jeopardy. | Court: No Napue error (answer struck and later testimony consistent), recording admissible as co‑conspirator statement (Petrozziello), no abuse of Rule 403 discretion, and double jeopardy claim foreclosed by Gamble. |
Key Cases Cited
- Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52 (RICO conspiracy requires agreement to facilitate a pattern of racketeering but not proof that defendant personally committed or agreed to commit the predicate acts)
- Smith v. United States, 568 U.S. 106 (allocating burden to defendant to prove withdrawal from a conspiracy does not violate due process)
- United States v. Ramírez‑Rivera, 800 F.3d 1 (First Circuit decision whose language requiring personal commission/agreement of predicates was treated as inconsistent with Salinas)
- United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71 (First Circuit applying Salinas to RICO conspiracy elements)
- United States v. Shifman, 124 F.3d 31 (pre‑Salinas First Circuit precedent quoted in Ramírez‑Rivera)
- United States v. Rivera‑Carrasquillo, 933 F.3d 33 (First Circuit decision that corrected pre‑Salinas language in an errata)
- United States v. Juodakis, 834 F.2d 1099 (withdrawal requires affirmative acts defeating or disavowing the conspiracy)
- United States v. Pizarro‑Berríos, 448 F.3d 1 (imprisonment alone does not establish withdrawal)
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (prosecutor must correct known false testimony)
- United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20 (First Circuit standard for admitting co‑conspirator statements under Rule 801(d)(2)(E))
- United States v. Saccoccia, 58 F.3d 754 (background First Circuit authority on broader conspiracy evidence admissibility)
- United States v. Ciresi, 697 F.3d 19 (standards for reviewing evidence and contested exhibits)
- Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960 (Supreme Court decision rejecting a broad dual‑sovereignty double jeopardy bar and foreclosing Aguirre's double jeopardy claim)