United States v. Leo Villarreal
707 F.3d 942
| 8th Cir. | 2013Background
- Villarreal was charged by a three-count indictment for aggravated sexual abuse and sexual abuse in Indian country, with Counts II and III resulting in guilty verdicts while Count I was dismissed on the verdict.
- The alleged offenses occurred at a party on Pine Ridge Indian Reservation, involving two sisters: Marissa (21) and L.L.H. (14).
- DNA testing and forensic analysis of evidence were delayed, prompting multiple government continuance motions under the Speedy Trial Act ends-of-justice provisions.
- The district court granted three continuances (Oct 5, 2010; Nov 29, 2010; Mar 2, 2011), each based on DNA testing needs, and Villarreal waived speedy-trial rights on some dates.
- Villarreal moved to dismiss under the Speedy Trial Act; the district court denied, and the government’s continuances were found excludable under §3161(h)(7)(A).
- On appeal, Villarreal challenged Speedy Trial Act rulings, Count II’s offense charging, Count III’s sufficiency, and a variance between Count III and the evidence; the panel affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Speedy Trial Act continuances excludable? | Villarreal argues delays were not diligent and not excludable. | Villarreal contends continuances were improper and should have dismissed. | Three continuances upheld as excludable. |
| Count II adequately states an offense under § 2241(a)(1)? | Count II fails to plead causation/engagement language properly. | Count II tracks sufficient elements via combination of statute and allegations. | Count II is not fatally defective; indictment suffices. |
| Sufficiency of Count III evidence for sexual abuse or attempt? | District court erred by accepting only an attempted theory. | Evidence supports attempted sexual abuse under § 2242(2)(B). | Sufficient evidence supports attempted sexual abuse conviction under § 2242(2)(B). |
| Variance between indictment and proof at Count III? | Marissa's later testimony about a forcible rape creates a variance. | No variance because second act was res gestae/admissible; not pleaded as a separate charge. | No material variance; no prejudice. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Herbst, 666 F.3d 504 (8th Cir. 2012) (application of Speedy Trial Act excludability standards and clear-error review)
- United States v. Aldaco, 477 F.3d 1008 (8th Cir. 2007) (non-excludable days, burden on defendant to show delay)
- Pennington, 168 F.3d 1060 (8th Cir. 1999) (liberal construction of indictments after jeopardy attaches)
- United States v. White, 241 F.3d 1015 (8th Cir. 2001) (indictment need not track exact statutory language if fair implication)
- United States v. Papakee, 573 F.3d 569 (8th Cir. 2009) (interpretation of § 2242(2) and sufficiency standards for sexual act)
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979) (standard for assessing sufficiency of evidence)