United States v. Leland Lapier, Jr.
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 13829
| 9th Cir. | 2015Background
- Leland Lapier was indicted on Count One for a single conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50+ grams of methamphetamine (Sept. 2011–Dec. 2012) and on Count Two for possession with intent to distribute; a jury convicted on both counts.
- Evidence showed Lapier bought large quantities of meth from two different suppliers at different times: Louis Kanyid (late 2011–Sept. 2012) and Burt Boucher (Oct.–Dec. 2012). Both suppliers "fronted" drugs to Lapier; Kanyid assisted in preparing drugs for resale.
- Kanyid’s arrest in Sept. 2012 ended that supply relationship; Lapier later obtained supply from Boucher. There was no evidence Kanyid and Boucher knew or agreed with one another.
- Lapier challenged only the conspiracy conviction on appeal, arguing (1) insufficient evidence of a conspiracy (only buyer–seller relationships) and (2) plain error because the district court did not give a specific-unanimity instruction sua sponte.
- The Ninth Circuit held the evidence was sufficient to support conspiracies with each supplier (fronting, quantity, and shared stake), but reversed Count One because the trial record evidenced at least two separate conspiracies while the indictment charged one, and the court failed to give a specific unanimity instruction, creating a genuine risk of a nonunanimous verdict.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency of evidence for conspiracy | Gov’t: evidence (fronting, large quantities, assistance) shows conspiratorial agreement | Lapier: relationships were mere buyer–seller transactions; no meeting of minds beyond sale | Held: Evidence sufficient to support conspiracies with each supplier (conviction could be supported on that basis) |
| Failure to give specific-unanimity instruction (plain error) | Gov’t: general unanimity instruction sufficient; any ambiguity harmless | Lapier: indictment charged single conspiracy but evidence showed multiple separate conspiracies; court should have instructed jurors to agree on which conspiracy | Held: Plain error — district court should have given specific unanimity instruction sua sponte; reversal of Count One and remand ordered |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence)
- Mincoff v. United States, 574 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2009) (circumstantial proof of conspiracy; fronting supports conspiracy)
- Moe v. United States, 781 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2015) (buyer–seller rule: sale alone insufficient for conspiracy)
- Payseno v. United States, 782 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1986) (specific-unanimity instruction required when jury confusion possible)
- United States v. Echeverry, 719 F.2d 974 (9th Cir. 1983) (risk of nonunanimous verdict when multiple conspiracies are possible)
- United States v. Gonzalez, 786 F.3d 714 (9th Cir. 2015) (distinguishing overt-act unanimity from unanimity as to which conspiracy)
- United States v. Gordon, 844 F.2d 1397 (9th Cir. 1988) (need for curative instructions where jury may convict based on different acts)
- Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292 (convictions carry collateral consequences; reversal of a count may be required even if sentence unaffected)