United States v. Lee Farkas, 669 F. App'x 122

Defendant Lee Bentley Farkas was prosecuted in federal court and sought recusal of the presiding district judge via motions under 28 U.S.C. § 144 and § 455(a).
Farkas filed an affidavit under § 144 alleging the judge had personal bias; the district judge evaluated the affidavit for legal sufficiency but not truth.
Farkas also moved under § 455(a), arguing the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned based on the judge’s financial losses during the 2006–2008 economic downturn and other materials.
The district court denied both recusal motions; Farkas appealed the denials to the Fourth Circuit in consolidated appeals.
The Fourth Circuit reviewed whether the filings alleged sufficiently particularized facts showing actual bias (§ 144) or facts that would lead a reasonable, well-informed observer to question impartiality (§ 455(a)).
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, concluding the § 144 affidavit was speculative and conclusory and the § 455(a) allegations were too tenuous to warrant recusal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 144 affidavit alleges judge’s personal bias requiring recusal	Farkas: affidavit alleges facts showing judge had personal bias against him	Government: affidavit is conclusory, speculative and legally insufficient	Denied — affidavit was conclusory/speculative and failed to allege sufficiently particularized facts
Whether § 455(a) requires recusal because judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned	Farkas: judge’s financial losses from 2006–2008 create a reasonable question of impartiality tied to Farkas’ conduct	Government: the financial losses are attenuated and do not create a reasonable appearance of bias	Denied — link between judge’s losses and Farkas’ conduct too tenuous to provoke a reasonable, well-informed observer
Whether the district court abused discretion in considering supporting declarations and materials	Farkas: district court improperly discounted or misweighed declarations	Government: district court acted within discretion to assess and reject unsupported materials	Denied — no abuse of discretion in how court addressed declarations
Whether timeliness or § 455(d)(4)(i) safe-harbor affects recusal analysis	Farkas: procedural arguments may excuse timing or affect remedy	Government: procedural defenses apply and motions insufficient on merits regardless	Court did not reach these procedural issues because motions fail on merits

Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1921) (distinguishes role of judge in evaluating sufficiency of recusal allegations)
Sine v. Local No. 992 Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 882 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1989) (describing sufficiency standards for § 144 affidavits)
United States v. Vespe, 868 F.2d 1328 (3d Cir. 1989) (judge evaluates legal sufficiency but not truth of § 144 allegations)
United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (conclusory allegations, opinions, or rumors insufficient for recusal)
United States v. Sykes, 7 F.3d 1331 (7th Cir. 1993) (§ 144 requires sufficiently definite and particular facts)
United States v. DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279 (4th Cir. 1998) (§ 455(a) uses objective reasonable-observer standard)
United States v. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658 (4th Cir. 2003) (unsupported or highly tenuous speculation insufficient for § 455 recusal)
In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1988) (attenuated relationships do not require recusal)
In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818 (4th Cir. 1987) (court evaluating § 455 need not accept allegations as true)