United States v. Lecharles Baldon, 956 F.3d 1115

Baldon pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine; district court sentenced him to 184 months.
FBI/DEA controlled buys and surveillance led agents to a storage unit rented to Angelique Baker; a drug-dog alerted and a search of the unit found a backpack with methamphetamine, heroin, and a loaded 9mm gun. Ammunition matching that caliber was found at Baldon’s residence.
At sentencing the district court: (1) added two criminal-history points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e) for two prior California carjacking convictions (Cal. Penal Code § 215), applying the modified categorical approach; and (2) applied a two-level § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement for possession of a firearm.
Baldon appealed, raising (A) whether § 215 carjacking qualifies as a "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e) and (B) whether the firearm enhancement was supported by the evidence.
The Ninth Circuit held that § 215 is not a categorical crime of violence (so the district court erred in criminal-history calculation) but affirmed the § 2D1.1(b)(1) firearm enhancement (constructive possession supported). Case remanded for resentencing.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether California § 215 (carjacking) is a categorical "crime of violence" under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(e) (i.e., matches the Guidelines' elements or enumerated-offenses clauses).	Government: § 215 qualifies under the elements (force) clause after Stokeling and under the enumerated-offenses clause as equivalent to robbery/extortion.	Baldon: § 215 can be satisfied by fear of injury to property alone (not force against the person), so it criminalizes broader conduct than the Guidelines' definition.	Held: § 215 is not a categorical crime of violence. Solorio‑Ruiz was abrogated by Stokeling; § 215 is indivisible and can be based on fear of injury to property, so neither the elements nor enumerated clauses match. District court erred in adding criminal-history points.
Whether the district court erred by applying a two-level § 2D1.1(b)(1) firearm enhancement (i.e., insufficient evidence of possession).	Government: Constructive possession established by (1) Baldon’s use/payment for the storage unit, (2) drugs and gun found together in the same backpack in that unit, and (3) matching ammunition at Baldon’s residence.	Baldon: Mere access or proximity to a weapon is insufficient; no proof he owned or knew of the gun (relying on Kelso/Cazares/Highsmith line).	Held: Affirmed. The district court did not clearly err—preponderance of evidence supports constructive possession and the enhancement.

Stokeling v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 544 (2019) (force sufficient to overcome a victim’s resistance qualifies as "violent force")
Solorio‑Ruiz v. Sessions, 881 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2018) (previous Ninth Circuit ruling on § 215; held abrogated by Stokeling)
Bankston v. United States, 901 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2018) (California robbery no longer a categorical match for Guidelines robbery/extortion definitions)
Becerril‑Lopez v. Holder, 541 F.3d 881 (9th Cir. 2008) (prior Ninth Circuit analysis equating § 211 robbery with Guidelines offenses; later abrogated)
Velasquez‑Bosque v. United States, 601 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2010) (earlier holding that § 215 matched combination of generic robbery and extortion under Guidelines)
Dixon v. Holder, 805 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2015) (disjunctive statutory phrasing can be alternative means, not divisible elements)
Kelso v. United States, 942 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1991) (mere access to a weapon is insufficient to prove constructive possession)
Cazares v. INS, 121 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1997) (mere residence or access in a shared dwelling insufficient to infer possession)
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (categorical approach requires presuming conviction rested on least culpable conduct criminalized)