United States v. Lawrence Taylor, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 19954

Background

In 2006 Lawrence Taylor pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm; a Presentence Report recommended an Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement based on two burglary convictions and a Texas injury-to-a-child conviction, producing a guideline range of 235–293 months and a 260-month sentence.
Taylor conceded at sentencing that the injury-to-a-child conviction was a violent felony and did not challenge that classification on appeal; prior § 2255 motions were denied.
After Johnson v. United States (invalidating the ACCA residual clause) and Welch (making Johnson retroactive), Taylor sought counsel and authorization to file a successive § 2255 claiming his injury-to-a-child offense no longer qualified under the ACCA.
The district court dismissed Taylor’s successive petition as untimely and ruled the residual clause “did not play any role” in sentencing, denying relief; this court later authorized filing and appointed the FPD, then the district court again dismissed, and Taylor appealed.
The government concedes (1) under Fifth Circuit precedent Texas injury-to-a-child is broader than the ACCA elements clause (so may not qualify post-Johnson) and (2) if Taylor’s claim is constitutional, his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum; the sole dispute is whether Taylor’s claim rests on a constitutional error (Johnson residual-clause-based) or a statutory mistake.
The Fifth Circuit here holds Taylor’s claim is constitutionally based, reverses the district court, vacates the ACCA enhancement under § 2106, reforms the sentence to the 10-year statutory maximum, and orders Taylor’s immediate release (he had served >129 months).

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Taylor’s challenge to his ACCA enhancement is a constitutional Johnson claim or a statutory claim	Taylor argues Johnson applies because his conviction may have been treated under the now-invalid residual clause, so his § 2255(h)(2) claim is constitutional and retroactive	Government argues Taylor must prove the sentencing court actually relied on the residual clause; absent that proof the error is statutory and not cognizable under § 2255(h)(2)	Court holds claim is constitutionally based because the record does not foreclose reliance on the residual clause and state of Fifth Circuit law made the predicate vulnerable to Johnson
Whether Texas injury-to-a-child qualifies as an ACCA elements-clause predicate post-Johnson	Taylor (and Fifth Circuit precedent) contend the Texas statute is broader than ACCA’s elements clause, so it may not qualify post-Johnson	Government previously conceded no controlling authority at sentencing showing it qualified under the elements clause	Court accepts Martinez-Rodriguez reasoning that the Texas offense is broader than the elements clause, so it may not qualify
Whether defendant’s failure to object at sentencing or on direct appeal bars collateral Johnson relief	Taylor argues he had no basis to object before Johnson and cannot be penalized for not anticipating the new rule	Government/district court argued Taylor should have challenged the predicate then and his failure forecloses § 2255 relief	Court rejects faulting Taylor for failing to foresee Johnson; absence of contemporaneous objection does not defeat a Johnson-based collateral claim
Remedy if claim is constitutional	Taylor seeks vacatur of ACCA enhancement and resentencing or release if sentence exceeds statutory maximum	Government concedes that if claim is constitutional it would agree relief is appropriate because Taylor’s sentence exceeds the statutory maximum	Court vacates the ACCA enhancement under § 2106, reforms sentence to the 10-year statutory maximum, and orders immediate release (time served > statutory maximum)

Key Cases Cited

Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (held ACCA residual clause violates due process)
Welch v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (Johnson announced a substantive rule retroactive on collateral review)
United States v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 857 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2017) (construed Texas injury-to-a-child as broader than ACCA elements clause)
United States v. Gracia-Cantu, 302 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 2002) (earlier Fifth Circuit precedent relevant to ACCA predicate analysis)
United States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 677 (4th Cir. 2017) (rejecting requirement that movant prove sentencing court specified reliance on residual clause)
United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2017) (applied Stromberg/Griffin principle to unclear sentencing reliance on multiple theories)
In re Chance, 831 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 2016) (held movant need only show § 924 clause may no longer authorize sentence post-Johnson)
In re Moore, 830 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2016) (discussed movant’s burden to show sentencing relied on residual clause)
In re Griffin, 823 F.3d 1350 (11th Cir. 2016) (addressed burden for proving Johnson-based entitlement)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (principle on retroactivity and treating similarly situated defendants)
Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46 (1991) (Stromberg/Griffin principle on general verdicts resting on invalid grounds applies analogously)