United States v. Lawrence Flack, 941 F.3d 238

In 2013, Lawrence Flack pled guilty to receipt and possession of child pornography and was sentenced to 262 months (bottom of the Guidelines).
Flack filed a § 2255 motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to argue that dual convictions (receipt + possession) violated Double Jeopardy; the district court denied relief.
This Court held counsel ineffective and issued a "general remand," directing the district court to vacate one conviction and giving the court discretion which to vacate and whether to resentence; the remand stated that if the possession conviction were vacated, "resentencing is not necessary" because the Guidelines range would remain unchanged.
On remand the district court vacated the possession conviction, kept the 262-month term, and expressly stated it "need not conduct a resentencing hearing" because the original sentence properly accounted for the § 3553(a) factors.
The panel held that the district court’s action was a resentencing (because it reevaluated § 3553(a) factors) rather than a mere mechanical correction; therefore, a resentencing hearing was required with Flack present and afforded allocution.
The Court vacated Flack’s sentence and remanded for a sentencing hearing consistent with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a) and § 3553(c); the panel acknowledged its own remand language likely contributed to the district court’s error.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a resentencing hearing is required on a § 2255 general remand when a duplicative conviction is vacated	Flack: Remand entitled him to a plenary resentencing hearing with right to be present and allocute	Gov: Remand allowed only a correction; no resentencing hearing was required because Guidelines unchanged	A resentencing hearing is required if the district court reexamines § 3553(a) factors; here the court did so, so a hearing was required
Whether the district court "corrected" the sentence or "resentenced" under § 2255(b)	Flack: The court resentenced him by evaluating § 3553(a) and reaffirming the same term	Gov: The court simply corrected a duplicative sentence and need not hold a hearing	The court’s reapplication of § 3553(a) amounted to a resentencing (not a purely mechanical correction), triggering the procedural protections of resentencing

United States v. Garcia-Robles, 640 F.3d 159 (6th Cir. 2011) (defendant entitled to plenary resentencing hearing on a general remand)
United States v. Brown, 879 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2018) (distinguishing mechanical correction from resentencing under § 2255)
United States v. Palmer, 854 F.3d 39 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (mechanical vacatur of unlawful convictions can be a correction)
Ajan v. United States, 731 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2013) (district courts have broad discretion in scope of post-§2255 proceedings)
United States v. Nichols, 897 F.3d 729 (6th Cir. 2018) (reasonableness review and § 3553(a) considerations in post-judgment contexts)
United States v. Mitchell, 905 F.3d 991 (6th Cir. 2018) (examples of corrections without a resentencing hearing)
United States v. DeMott, 513 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2008) (other circuits uniformly require resentencing hearing on general remand)