United States v. Lavin, 1:15-cr-00667

Background

Travell Thomas co‑owned and ran Four Star Resolution, a debt‑collection operation that used scripted misrepresentations, inflated balances (“juicing”), and repeated collection attempts to coerce payments; Four Star collected over $31 million from victims.
Federal grand jury returned an S4 indictment charging Thomas with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and substantive wire fraud (2010–2015); he was arrested, arraigned, and represented by a four‑attorney team.
Thomas pleaded guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement (stipulated Guidelines range 151–188 months), allocuted to the fraudulent conduct, and waived appellate/collateral challenges to sentences within or below the stipulated range (carve‑out for ineffective assistance claims).
The Court accepted the plea, adopted the PSR, and sentenced Thomas to concurrent 100‑month terms (substantially below the Guidelines).
Thomas filed a pro se § 2255 motion asserting ineffective assistance by attorney Scott Riordan for (1) failing to challenge characterization as a “debt collector,” (2) poor plea negotiation/advice rendering the plea unknowing and involuntary, and (3) failing to challenge government standing and subject‑matter jurisdiction.
The district court denied the § 2255 motion, finding no deficient performance or prejudice, rejecting the standing/jurisdiction claim, and denying requests for discovery or an evidentiary hearing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Indictment/jurisdiction — characterization as a “debt collector”	Thomas: He was a defaulted‑debt purchaser (not a debt collector under Henson), so indictment defective and jurisdiction lacking.	Gov: Ownership of debt is irrelevant to wire‑fraud elements; indictment alleges a scheme to defraud using wires, which suffices.	Court: Henson does not bar wire‑fraud prosecution; owning debts is irrelevant to wire fraud; counsel not ineffective for failing to pursue this meritless defense.
2. Ineffective assistance — plea negotiations and advice	Thomas: Riordan failed to explain sentencing exposure, risks, waiver consequences, and benefits; plea was therefore unknowing/involuntary.	Gov: Plea colloquy and record show Thomas understood terms, maximum exposure, appellate waiver, and received benefit (3‑level acceptance reduction and locked Guidelines).	Court: No deficient performance shown; plea knowing and voluntary; no prejudice (no reasonable probability Thomas would have gone to trial).
3. Ineffective assistance — failure to challenge future prosecutions and plea terms	Thomas: Plea permitted later enhancements, recharging, and other prosecutions; counsel should have negotiated better protections.	Gov: Terms are standard, co‑defendants got similar offers, and government would not have given better terms; counsel negotiated and obtained acceptance credit.	Court: Boilerplate provisions not objectively unreasonable; counsel’s negotiation was reasonable; no prejudice.
4. Standing / subject‑matter jurisdiction	Thomas: Government lacks Article III standing because alleged victims suffered no concrete injury; thus prosecution invalid.	Gov: Criminal prosecutions are brought on behalf of the sovereign; Article III private‑party standing requirements do not control criminal standing; 18 U.S.C. § 3231 supplies jurisdiction.	Court: Rejected importation of private standing rules into criminal prosecutions; United States has standing to prosecute; claim is meritless.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two‑prong ineffective assistance standard)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (prejudice inquiry for counsel errors affecting guilty pleas)
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 (allocutions in open court carry strong presumption of verity)
Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718 (interpretation of “debt collector” under the FDCPA)
Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (right to effective counsel in plea negotiations)
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (duty to communicate plea offers)
Weingarten v. United States, 865 F.3d 48 (2d Cir.) (counsel not ineffective for failing to raise frivolous claims)
Puglisi v. United States, 586 F.3d 209 (2d Cir.) (when material facts are disputed, a §2255 hearing is usually required)