United States v. Laurent
2011 WL 6004606
E.D.N.Y2011Background
- Defendant Laurent was indicted federally under 18 U.S.C. § 922(n) for receiving a firearm while under felony indictment; prior state charges had been filed against Laurent for weapon possession and related offenses in Kings County Supreme Court; NYPD officers arrested him after a gun was found following an alleged robbery incident; the government sought dismissal avoidance and a bill of particulars to specify when Laurent received the gun; the court granted the bill of particulars and held the government must prove receipt after indictment to sustain § 922(n) liability; the court denied the facial challenge and retained the indictment, directing dismissal if the government cannot prove receipt after indictment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Constitutionality of § 922(n) facially and as applied | Laurent argues § 922(n) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied given due process, equal protection, and Second Amendment concerns. | Laurent contends the statute improperly restricts a fundamental right without individualized determinations and may fail Commerce Clause or due process tests. | Statute valid on its face and as applied. |
| Commerce Clause applicability of § 922(n) | Gaines-style challenge suggesting lack of interstate nexus. | Statute sufficiently nexus to interstate commerce per Second Circuit precedent. | No merit to Commerce Clause challenge. |
| Fifth Amendment notice requirement for indictment knowledge | Knowledge of indictment should be required to convict under § 922(n). | Knowledge of indictment is not expressly required by statute; some circuits require it. | Knowledge of indictment required for conviction; notice satisfied under the statute as construed. |
| Presumption of innocence and due process | Indictment-based restrictions threaten presumption of innocence and pretrial liberty protections. | Indictment alone does not erase presumption; protections exist via due process calculations and post-indictment procedures. | Presumption of innocence not violated; due process concerns addressed within intermediate scrutiny framework. |
| Second Amendment scrutiny level and § 922(n) burden | § 922(n) imposes a substantial burden on the right to bear arms in the home and should be strict scrutiny. | § 922(n) imposes a limited, temporary burden with a substantial government interest in public safety; applied with intermediate scrutiny. | § 922(n) survives intermediate scrutiny; it is narrowly tailored to important government interests. |
Key Cases Cited
- Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S. 570 (U.S. 2008) (recognizes an individual right to bear arms limited by certain regulations)
- United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792 (10th Cir. 2010) (applies intermediate scrutiny to gun restrictions on certain classes of individuals)
- United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholds restrictions on gun access by individuals with certain histories under intermediate scrutiny)
- United States v. Rivera, 844 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1988) (addressed constructive possession under prior § 922(h)(1); discusses receipt concepts)